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Injunctions for Defamation, Juries,
and the Clarifying Lens of 1868
STEPHEN A. SIEGELt
INTRODUCTION
Over the past half century, constitutional protection for
freedom of speech has broadened' and strengthened. 2 In
t Distinguished Research Professor and Associate Dean for Research,
Scholarship, and Faculty Development, DePaul University College of Law. The
author thanks Alfred Brophy, Andrew Gold, Mark Moller, and Spencer Waller
for critical commentary on earlier drafts. My interest in injunctions for
defamation began when I participated in the Brief Amici Curiae of Historians
Alfred L. Brophy, Paul Finkelman, Kermit L. Hall, Michael I. Meyerson, and
Stephen A. Siegel in Support of Petitioners, Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734
(2005). This article differs, to some extent, with the history discussed therein
and adds a focus on the Reconstruction period. Any mistakes in this revised and
augmented discussion are attributable to me.
1. Areas that used to be excluded from First Amendment protection have
been included. Commercial speech and defamation are two examples. Compare
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976) (protecting commercial speech), with Valentine v. Chrestensen,
316 U.S. 52 (1942) (stating commercial speech is outside First Amendment);
compare New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (supporting
stringent protection of defamatory speech about public officials), with
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (listing "the libelous"
among unprotected types of speech).
2. Compare, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (stating
advocacy of crime protected by stringent "clear and present danger" test), with
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (stating advocacy of crime
protected by balancing formulation of danger test) and Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357 (1927) (stating advocacy of crime protected by "bad tendency"
test). Consider also the increasing stringency of the application of the law
protecting fighting words, political donations, and commercial speech. See, e.g.,
FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2652, 2674-79 (2007) (Scalia, J.
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only a few areas has it weakened. 3 This Article is about one
of the areas of weakening protection: injunctions for
defamation.
Defamation is one of the most prominent areas that
generally receives far greater protection than it did a half
century ago. Before New York Times v. Sullivan,4
defamation was a strict liability tort.5 Speech that was
simply mistaken could be the predicate for civil liability.6
Now there is a complex body of highly protective rules
guarding defamatory speech. 7 On matters of public concern,
there can be no liability without "actual malice" if a public
figure or official is involved, and no liability without
negligence if the remarks concern a private figure.5 An
award of presumed or punitive damages also requires
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (urging strict scrutiny for
campaign donations); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001)
(urging strict scrutiny of commercial speech and applying intermediate scrutiny
test stringently); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1002-08 (3d ed.
2006) (discussing Court's greater protection for fighting words). In general, on
the strengthening of First Amendment protections, see Stephen A. Siegel, The
Death and Rebirth of the Clear and Present Danger Test, in TRANSFORMATIONS
IN AMERICAN LAW (Alfred Brophy & Daniel Hamilton eds.) (forthcoming 2008)
(recounting the rise, fall, and transformation of the clear and present danger
test); Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and
Strict Scrutiny, 48 J. OF AM. LEGAL HIST. 355 (2006) (tracing strict scrutiny to
First Amendment cases in the early 1960s).
3. Sexually oriented expression is the primary area. Obscenity has never
been protected, but over the past-half century the conception of obscenity has
broadened. Compare Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 39 (1973) (stating
obscenity is a prurient work that "lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value"), with A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure" v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966) (stating obscenity is based
on judicial determination that prurient speech is "utterly without redeeming
social value"). In addition, non-obscene sexually oriented speech has become
less protected as low-value expression. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Alameda
Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002).
4. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
5. See also DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1120 (2000); 1 RODNEY A.
SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 1:7 (2d. ed. 1999).
6. See DOBBS, supra note 5, at 1119-20; 1 SMOLLA, supra note 5, §§ 1:7-1:8.
7. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 1045-55; DOBBS, supra note 5, at 1121,
1169-72; SMOLLA, supra note 5, passim.
8. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 1045-55; DOBBS, supra note 5, at 1121,
1169-72; SMOLLA, supra note 5, §§ 1:17-1:20. Whether the current law for
remarks about private figures and matters not of public concern differs from the
traditional common law is unclear. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 1054-55;
DOBBS, supra note 5, at 1121; SMOLLA, supra note 5, § 1:20.
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"actual malice."9 In addition, judges are required to review
jury determinations de novo and make independent
determinations of whether the speech is defamatory and
made with the requisite state of mind.10
Bucking this trend is the fact that enjoining defamation
has more support today than fifty years ago. A half century
ago enjoining defamatory speech was impermissible. As
stated by a leading treatise on defamation: "One of the
unwavering precepts of the American law of remedies has
long been the axiom that equity will not enjoin a libel."'"
Now, the rule is less certain. Over the past thirty years,
several state courts of last resort have upheld injunctions
restraining defamatory speech.' 2 So have federal appellate
courts. 13 In 2005, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on
the issue but issued an inconclusive opinion because the
plaintiff died before an opinion could issue. 14 During oral
argument, however, several Justices expressed sympathy
for the plaintiffs plight and the need, if not the
constitutionality, of enjoining speakers from repeating
9. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 1053; DOBBS, supra note 5, at 1121;
SMOLLA, supra note 5, § 1:19.
10. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 1047; 2 SMOLLA, supra note 5, §§
12:83-12:86.
11. 2 SMOLLA, supra note 5, § 9:85. See also DOBBS, supra note 5, at 1193-94;
Michael I. Meyerson, The Neglected History of the Prior Restraint Doctrine:
Rediscovering the Link Between the First Amendment and the Separation of
Powers, 34 IND. L. REV. 295, 308-11, 324-330 (2001); Annotation, Injunction as
Remedy Against Defamation of Person, 47 A.L.R.2D 715, 715-16 (1956).
12. See, e.g., Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339 (Cal. 2007);
Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 218 S.E.2d 54 (Ga. 1975); Advanced Training Sys.,
Inc. v. Caswell Equip. Co., 352 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1984); O'Brien v. Univ. Cmty.
Tenants Union, Inc., 327 N.E.2d 753, 755 (Ohio 1975). See also Sid Dillon
Chevrolet-Oldsmobile-Pontiac, Inc. v. Sullivan, 559 N.W.2d 740, 747 (Neb.
1997) (dicta) (indicating approval of post-trial injunction of defamation). Several
intermediate state courts have approved injunctions for defamation. See, e.g.,
Barlow v. Sipes, 744 N.E.2d 1, 9-10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); Bingham v. Struve,
591 N.Y.S.2d 156, 158 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); Dickson v. Dickson, 529 P.2d 476,
478 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975).
13. See, e.g., San Antonio Cmty. Hosp. v. S. Cal. Dist. Council of Carpenters,
125 F.3d 1230, 1237 (9th Cir. 1997); Brown v. Petrolite Corp., 965 F.2d 38, 50-
51 (5th Cir. 1992); Lothschuetz v. Carpenter, 898 F.2d 1200, 1208-09 (6th Cir.
1990). See also Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666, 677 (3d Cir. 1991)
(criticizing the no-injunction rule but applying it in a diversity case because
that was required by state law).
14. Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734, 736-39 (2005).
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defamatory statements. 15
This Article seeks to revise our understanding of the
traditional rule's history and to discuss the implications of
that revision for the current debate on the no-injunction
rule's continued propriety.16 The historiography of the rule
traces back to Roscoe Pound's article Equitable Relief
Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality.17 Pound
was the seminal critic of the traditional rule.'8 He initiated
its academic criticism in 1916. He has been followed by
many scholars, 19 and, in the past thirty years, by a growing
15. Transcript of Oral Argument at 14-26, Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734
(2005) (No. 03-1488), 2005 WL 752743 (various Justices expressing sympathy
toward plaintiff).
16. Although I have somewhat different conclusions and write to establish
different points, my research is substantially indebted to Professor Michael I.
Meyerson's earlier consideration of the topic, supra note 11, at 308-13, 324-33.
17. 29 HARv. L. REV. 640 (1916).
18. Pound's article was anticipated by A.C. Freeman, Enjoining the
Publication of Libels, 4 CENT. L.J. 171 (1877). Freeman's short piece did not have
nearly the same influence as Pound's far more elaborate consideration.
The article is signed "A.C.F." I attribute it to Abraham Clark Freeman
because "A.C. Freeman, Sacramento, Cal." is listed as a contributing editor to the
volume. Id. at i. The biographical material, about Abraham Clark Freeman,
stating that he was living in Sacramento at the time, comes from Abraham Clark
Freeman, http://freepages.genealogy.rootsweb.ancestry.com/-npmelton/sfbfre.htm
(last visited April 19, 2008).
19. See, e.g., William 0. Bertelsman, Injunctions Against Speech and
Writing: A Re-Evaluation, 59 KY. L.J. 319 (1971); Estella Gold, Does Equity Still
Lack Jurisdiction to Enjoin a Libel or Slander?, 48 BROOK. L. REV. 231 (1982);
Joseph R. Long, Equitable Jurisdiction to Protect Personal Rights, 33 YALE L.J.
115 (1923); Robert Allen Sedler, Injunctive Relief and Personal Integrity, 9 ST.
LouIs U. L.J. 147, 147-66 (1964); William F. Walsh, Equitable Protection of
Personal Rights, 7 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 878 (1930); Note, Developments in the Law-
Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 875, 943-45 (1956).
The scholarly attack on the no-injunction rule is related to discomfiture with
the stringency of the traditional ban on prior restraints, which also has been
under attack. See, e.g., John Calvin Jeifries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92
YALE L.J. 409 (1983); William T. Mayton, Toward a Theory of First Amendment
Process: Injunctions of Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the
Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 245 (1982); Martin H. Redish, The
Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA.
L. REV. 53 (1984). But see Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint:
The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11 (1981) (supporting the doctrine); L.A.
Powe, Jr., The H-Bomb Injunction, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 55 (1990) (supporting
the doctrine). Although it is part of the law of prior restraints, the rule against
enjoining defamation is sufficiently separate to merit independent treatment.
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number of courts.20
In Pound's view, the rule was "by no means settled by
authority" at the nation's founding. 21 I will argue that it
was. Also in Pound's view, the rule was founded on such
anachronistic concerns as the limitation of equity's
jurisdiction to the protection of property rights.22 I will
argue that it was founded on considerations that still
should influence us: distrust of judges and respect for the
role of juries in free speech controversies. 23
In addition, I seek to establish a point with which
Pound and subsequent scholars of the issue had no concern.
Whatever the situation at the nation's founding in 1789, the
rule that enjoining defamatory speech violated
constitutional norms of free speech and trial by jury was
clearly established by 1868 when the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted.
Pound was not an originalist. He was among leaders of
the Progressive movement who believed in a living
constitution.24 Indeed, Pound began his seminal article
criticizing the traditional rule by quoting Oliver Wendell
Holmes's acerbic remark that
20. See supra text accompanying notes 12-15.
21. Pound, supra note 17, at 645 (saying that as late as 1818 the rule was
not settled).
22. See id. at 642-44. Pound discusses other rationales but emphasizes this
one.
23. Pound acknowledges but downplays these considerations, see id. at 648-
57, saying "most of the cases ... proceed either upon the proposition that equity
will not protect interests of personality or simply on authority." But see id., at
656-57 (admitting that the "clear" common law policy favoring jury trials is the
most "serious difficulty in the way of injunctions" for defamation).
24. See id. at 654 (saying "we cannot safely rely on history to give us the
proper construction" of the First Amendment with regard to the no-injunction
rule). Pound's objection to originalism followed from his sociological
jurisprudence. See MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH 71-74 (1991)
(discussing Pound); Howard Gillman, The Collapse of Constitutional
Originalism and the Rise of the Notion of the "Living Constitution" in the Course
of American State-Building, 11 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 191, 220 (1997) (discussing
Pound); cf. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARv. L.
REV. 932, 954-55 (1919). Chafee was a close follower of Pound and taught a
course that used Pound's materials on injunctions for defamation. See
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR. & ROSCOE POUND, CASES ON EQUITABLE RELIEF AGAINST
TORTS INCLUDING DEFAMATION AND INJURIES TO PERSONALITY (1933); Jerold S.
Auerbach, The Patrician as Libertarian: Zechariah Chafee, Jr. and Freedom of
Speech, 42 NEW ENG. Q. 511, 514, 516 (1969) (discussing Pound and Chafee).
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[i]t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule
of law than that it was laid down in the reign of
Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds
upon which it was laid down have vanished long
since and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past.25
That may be. But to an originalist, that a rule was in place
in 1789 or 1868 is critical. 26
Or so, to an originalist, it should be. I say "or so it
25. Pound, supra note 17, at 640 (quoting O.W. Holmes, The Path of the
Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
26. Originalism is a constitutional jurisprudence with many variants, such
as "original intent," "original understanding," "original meaning," and "original
objective-public-meaning textualism"; with some form of "original public
meaning" originalism being the currently most-favored. See, e.g., RANDY E.
BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 89-117 (2004); JACK N. RAKOVE,
ORIGINAL MEANINGS 7-22 (1996); Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and
Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427, 442-454 (2007); Martin S.
Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1811-1816 (1996);
Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the
Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1124-48 (2003). The
evidence I present in this paper should be convincing under any approach to
originalism because of the extent to which "original expected applications [is]
very strong evidence of original meaning, even (or perhaps especially) when the
text points to abstract principles or standards." Balkin, supra, at 449. See also
Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical
as it Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 265-69 (2005) (discussing extent to
which contemporaneous or subsequent precedent properly determines abstract
constitutional provisions).
Within intramural debates among originalists, certain terms are frequently
taken as code for favoring one strand over others. A focus on the Framers
implies concern for "original intent"; a focus on the ratifiers implies a concern
for "original understanding"; a focus on dictionaries and surrounding legal
material implies a concern for "original meaning." Yet all these various sources
may be taken as evidence for other flavors of originalism. What certain terms
meant to the Framers is evidence of what it meant to the ratifiers, and is also
evidence of its public meaning. Accordingly, when this paper mentions an
interest in the Framers, ratifiers, founding generation, expected applications,
and so on, I do not mean to embrace a particular branch of the originalist
school. I am giving evidence that may be used by them all. Particularly with
regard to the role played by the expected applications: in certain versions of
originalism, the expected applications of constitutional text by the framing and
ratifying generation may not be definitive of constitutional meaning. But if in a
particular instance constitutional meaning is said to depart from the expected
application, that needs to be explained. Especially when the expected
application harmonizes with the chosen text and coincides with principles
which were thought then, and still thought today, to underlie the text. I think
there is an irrebutable case that the expected application is constitutionally
required-at least on originalist grounds.
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should be" not as a taunt to those originalists who ignore
the historic record when it presents them with outcomes
with which they disagree on policy grounds. 27 Rather, I say
this because contemporary originalists seem not to
appreciate fully the implications of their beliefs when it
comes to the nation's second founding in the aftermath of
the Civil War. In determining the law of the Fourteenth
Amendment, originalists focus on the intent of the
Amendment's Framers and ratifiers and on the public
meaning of the text in 1868 when discussing the meaning of
such Fourteenth Amendment norms as "privileges and
immunities," "due process," and "equal protection. ' 28
At the same time, originalists generally ignore the
understanding of the generation that framed and ratified
the Fourteenth Amendment when it comes to such
Fourteenth Amendment restrictions on the states as free
speech, religious liberty and establishment, search and
seizure-the entire incorporated Bill of Rights. 29
Originalists are concerned with whether the Fourteenth
Amendment was originally understood as incorporating
some or all of the Bill of Rights as limitations on the
states.30 Yet, when it comes to discussing the substantive
content of those rights, the focus remains mired in 1789.31
27. See infra text accompanying note 396 (discussing the faithfulness or
"faint-heartedness" of some originalists).
28. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2d ed., Liberty Fund, Inc.
1997) (1977); EARL M. MALTZ, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE LAW OF
THE CONSTITUTION (2003).
29. Some originalists have objected that the Fourteenth Amendment was
not intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights, but the weight of current
historiography is in favor of the view that it did. Compare RAOUL BERGER, THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1989), with AKHIL REED
AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 193-214 (1998).
Given that courts do apply the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth
Amendment, the question for originalists is whether the views of the Founding
or Reconstruction era drafters and ratifiers apply.
30. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 29.
31. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49-51
(2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing the Establishment Clause);
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 92-99 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(discussing the Fourth Amendment); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n., 514
U.S. 334, 359-69 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing the Free Speech
Clause); Thomas Y. Davies, Not "The Framers' Design": How the Framing-Era
Ban Against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis "Testimonial"
Formulation of the Scope of the Original Confrontation Clause, 15 J. OF L. &
2008] 661
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This seems an error. 32 In various areas, American
constitutionalism evolved between 1789 and 1868.33 At the
least, ambiguities with regard to the content of some
liberties were clarified over the seventy years that elapsed
between the nation's Founding and its Reconstruction. With
regard to the rule against injunctions for defamatory
speech, the evidence is fuller and clearer in 1868 than it
was when the Bill of Rights was initially adopted. What
may have been ambiguous in 1791 was clarified by 1868.
There was a line of growth consistent with the sentiments
of the Founding era that defined it more clearly.
This Article contributes to the contemporary practice of
originalism by illustrating the importance of shifting our
focus from the meaning of the Bill of Rights in 1789 to its
meaning in 1868-at least when discussing the limitations
imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment. In writing the
history of the rule against enjoining defamatory speech,
Roscoe Pound and his followers may have been unconcerned
POL'y 349 (2007) (discussing Sixth Amendment); Andrew S. Gold, Regulatory
Takings and Original Intent, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 181, 226-27 (1999) (discussing
Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause). But see McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 372-73
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (mentioning both 1791 and 1868); AMAR, supra note 29,
at 231-83 (focusing on Reconstruction era); Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive
Due Process After Gonzales v. Carhart, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1517, 1532-34, 1537-
39 (2008) (focusing on the meaning of fundamental rights in 1868); KURT T.
Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the
Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085 (1995) (focusing on
developments between 1791 and 1868); William K. Lietzau, Rediscovering the
Establishment Clause: Federalism and the Rollback of Incorporation, 39
DEPAUL L. REV. 1191 (1990) (focusing on both periods but reaching opposite
conclusion from Lash).
32. I am unaware of any discussion by an originalist asserting, as a matter
of theory, that the meaning of the Bill of Rights in 1789 should be preferred to
its meaning in 1868 when the subject is the limitations the Fourteenth
Amendment imposes on the states. In addition, I am unable to conceive of a
persuasive originalist argument asserting the view that, with regard to the
states, the meaning of the Bill in 1789 is to be preferred to its meaning in 1868.
In discussions, some originalists have suggested the importance of "consistency"
between the rights held against the national and state governments. The desire
for consistency, however, is not justified on originalist grounds. In addition,
consistency may be brought about by imposing the meaning of the Bill in 1868
on the national government, rather than vice-versa. See AMAR, supra note 29, at
243-44 (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment, through "a doctrinal
'feedback effect"' affects the First Amendment).
33. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 29, at 216-17, 220-23 (discussing the Second
Amendment); Lash, supra note 31 (discussing the Establishment Clause). But
see Lietzau, supra note 31 (arguing Establishment Clause principles did not
change).
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with this. With contemporary originalism's growth in power
and prestige, it should be of increasing importance to
American constitutional debate.
Part I discusses civil and criminal liability for
defamation and the history of prior restraints in both law
and equity. It concludes that the weight of historical
evidence strongly supports the conclusion that the Framers
and ratifiers of the First Amendment would have expected
that equity had no power to enjoin defamatory speech.
Central to their expectation was their insistence that juries
always mediate between speakers and government
sanctions of their speech. Acknowledging that the
conclusion of Part I is an informed historical judgment, Part
II explores the same topic in the Reconstruction era to show
that for the generation that framed and ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment, the rule that equity had no power
to enjoin defamation was established beyond a reasonable
doubt. The central reason for continued adherence to the
rule was the importance of jury participation in First
Amendment controversies. As compared to the
Revolutionary era, Reconstruction-era judges may have
been trusted more and juries less. Still, the judge-jury
relation was constructed to give speakers a "double
protection."34 Jury verdicts were still considered necessary
for any government suppression of speech.
For originalists, the implication of Parts I and II for the
current debate about the continued vitality of the no
injunction for defamation rule is clear: the no-injunction
rule must be retained.
Recognizing that many jurists are not originalists, Part
III explores the implications for non-originalists of the jury-
centered system of free speech adopted by the Founding-
and Reconstruction-era constitution makers. If non-
originalists conclude that it is proper to depart from the
traditional no-injunction rule, 35 Part III argues for two jury-
centered limitations on the recession: that no injunction
issue without a jury determination that the speech was
34. See infra text accompanying notes 267, 291, 392 (discussing protection
from the judge and jury).
35. The paper takes no position on whether non-originalists should support
any retreat from the no-injunction rule. While suggestive on the larger issue,
the discussion here is directed at establishing important limitations should
there be any recession.
2008] 663
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defamatory; and that no injunction be enforced without a
jury determination that the injunction was violated by
speech that continues to be defamatory. By insisting on the
inclusion of a jury in both the liability and enforcement
proceedings, the insight of the Framers on the importance
of a popular check on government regulation of speech may
be retained.
In this way, the Article contributes to the substantive
debate on the future of the no injunction for defamation
rule while it illustrates the importance of focusing on 1868
when interpreting the restrictions the Fourteenth
Amendment imposes on the states.
I. INJUNCTIONS FOR DEFAMATION IN THE FOUNDING ERA
A. Context-Other Sanctions for Defamation.
At the Founding, certain aspects of the law of
defamation and their implications for the meaning of the
First Amendment were in flux and highly controversial.
Others were not. The controversial and uncontroversial
areas fall into a pattern that is useful to our discussion of
injunctions for defamation if we separate consideration of
the government's ability to redress defamation through a
system of prior restraints from its ability to impose
subsequent punishment. It will also be helpful to discuss
the law of subsequent punishment first, as that will lay a
foundation for our focus on the Founding generation's
understanding of equity's ability to enjoin defamatory
remarks.
1. Subsequent Punishment. At the founding, as well as
today, society's ability to deter and punish defamation was
divided into the law of civil liability and the law of criminal
liability.
a. Civil Liability. In the late eighteenth century,
the common law system of civil remedies for defamation
was not a matter of political, legal, or constitutional
controversy. According to Blackstone, legal protection of
reputation was an important aspect of the right to personal
security.36 Defamation encompassed any spoken or written
36. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *119 (Thomas Cooley ed., 3d
664 [Vol. 56
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communication published to a third party that "set [an
individual] in an odious or ridiculous light, and thereby
diminish[ed] his reputation," tended to "exclude him from
society," "impair[ed] or hurt his trade or livelihood," or
impeached his title to property. 37 Truth was an affirmative
defense. 38 But if the defendant could not prove his remark
to be true or privileged, 39 liability ensued. At common law,
defamation was a strict liability tort.40
One facet of a civil suit for defamation was that it was
impossible for a defendant to be found liable without a jury
verdict against him.41 In the eighteenth century, the
necessity of a jury verdict was not unique to defamation
suits; it was true for civil actions generally.42 Eighteenth
century trial judges, in both England and America, had the
power to state their view of the facts and the law of the case
to a jury. They could ask for a special verdict. If trial or
appellate judges thought a jury's verdict was not
Am. ed. 1884) (1765).
37. Id. at *123-126.
38. See id. at *125-26.
39. See id. at *125. Blackstone mentions words spoken as friendly advice or
as part of a legal proceeding as examples of privileged communication.
40. For an overview of common law defamation, see DOBBS, supra note 5, at
1119-20.
41. For the remarks in this paragraph, see 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at
*286-97, *374-78; JAMES OLDHAM, TRIAL BY JURY, THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT AND
ANGLO-AMERICAN SPECIAL JURIES 9-13 (2006); William Blume, Origin and
Development of the Directed Verdict, 48 MICH. L. REV. 555, 559-66 (1950); Leo
Carlin, Judgment Non Obstante Veredicto, 51 W. VA. L.Q. 14, 14-19 (1948);
Edith Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV.
289, 299-317 (1966); Ren6e Lettow, New Trial for Verdict Against Law: Judge-
Jury Relations in Early Nineteenth Century America, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
505, 508-22 (1996); Austin Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil
Procedure, 31 HARV. L. REV. 669, 680-89 (1918); Suja A. Thomas, The Seventh
Amendment, Modern Procedure, and the English Common Law, 82 WASH. U.
L.Q. 687, 706-07, 709-15, 722-25, 728-30, 732-33, 735, 737-40, 742-46 (2004). My
comment assumes the defendant had pleaded his case properly, see Carlin,
supra, at 15-16, and that he had not elected to demur to the evidence. See infra
text accompanying note 44. Edith Henderson's views on the binding quality of
eighteenth century directed verdicts have been supplanted by James Oldham's
research. Compare Henderson, supra, at 302, with OLDHAM, supra, at 12-13 and
Thomas, supra, at 728-29 (citing and supporting Oldham). Austin Scott's views
on the judge's inability to compel a plaintiffs non-suit have been supplanted
also. Compare Scott, supra, at 687, with OLDHAM, supra, at 10-11 and
Henderson, supra, at 300.
42. It became unique over the course of the nineteenth century. See infra
text accompanying notes 260-62.
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sufficiently supported by the evidence, they had the power
to grant a new trial. They had the power to non-suit a
plaintiff. Judges had great influence and frequently got
what they wanted from juries. But they had no power to
compel a verdict against a defendant. Neither did they have
the power to take the case from a jury and enter a verdict. 43
The only eighteenth century techniques by which a
defendant might be found liable without a jury verdict
involved demurring to the pleadings or the evidence.
However, those procedures were elective with the
defendant.44
Eighteenth century judge-jury relations in civil trials
indicate "[a] conception of the jury as a bulwark against the
unjust use of governmental power... [a] distrust of 'legal
experts' and a faith in the ability of the common people."45
Civil juries functioned as an important "check on the
manipulation of the law as an instrument of royal
despotism."46
b. Criminal Liability. In the late eighteenth
century, defamation was a crime as well as a tort.47 Civil
43. The modern technique of jury control, primarily the directed verdict and
entering a judgment N.O.V., did not develop until the mid-nineteenth century.
See, e.g., Eric Schnapper, Judges Against Juries-Appellate Review of Federal
Civil Jury Verdicts, WiS. L. REV. 237, 239 (1989); infra text accompanying note
260. Summary judgment is even more recent. See infra note 260 (discussing
summary judgment).
44. See, e.g., Stephan Landsman, Appellate Courts and Civil Juries, 70 U.
CIN. L. REV. 873, 890 (2002); Thomas, supra note 41, at 709-15. Demurring to
the evidence was rarely done. Thomas, supra note 41, at 709-10. Juries might
bring in a special verdict limited to the facts of the case, but they could not be
compelled to do so. See Scott, supra note 41, at 684; Thomas, supra note 41, at
733. To the extent juries elected to state the facts and leave application of the
law to the judge, a defendant-to that limited extent-might be found liable
without a general verdict against him. The salient point is that a judge could
not compel such a limited verdict.
45. Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE
L.J. 170, 172 (1964).
46. Id. at 171.
47. See 8 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 333-34, 336 (1925).
Criminal prosecutions persisted in America throughout the nineteenth century.
See, e.g., State v. McKee, 46 A. 409 (Conn. 1900) (upholding prosecution of a
newspaper "principally made up of criminal news"); In re Banks, 42 P. 693
(Kan. 1895) (upholding prosecution of newspaper "devoted largely to the
publication of scandals"); State v. Boogher, 3 Mo. App. 442 (1877) (upholding
criminal libel of a business corporation). Defamation still may be made a crime
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liability redressed defamation's private injury while
criminal sanctions redressed its public harm. 48 Criminal
prosecution was appropriate, Blackstone said, because of
defamation's "direct tendency" to cause breaches of the
king's peace and unsettle the body politic. 49 The famous and
highly politicized crime of "seditious libel" was a branch of
the criminal law of defamation and shared its substantive
norms and procedures. 50 Seditious libel redressed libel's
ability "to breed in the people a dislike of their governors,
and incline them to faction and sedition"51  when
magistrates or the system of government were held up to
"public hatred, contempt, and ridicule. ' 52
In one important regard criminal defamation was
narrower than civil defamation: criminal defamation
applied only to written communication and not to oral
remarks. 53 Yet within the field of written communication, it
today, although its constitutional contours are different. The Supreme Court
upheld a criminal libel statute in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952)
(group libel). Recent cases, all in the lower courts, have tended to void criminal
defamation laws as vague and overbroad. 1 SMOLLA, supra note 5, at § 4:52. But
this leaves open the possibility of a properly-drawn statute being upheld.
48. For the remarks in the following paragraphs, see 4 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 36, at *150-51; 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 47, at 333-46; LEONARD W.
LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 4-15 (1985); Philip Hamburger, The
Development of the Law of Seditious Libel and the Control of the Press, 37 STAN.
L. REV. 661 (1985); Henderson, supra note 41, at 328-35.
49. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *150. For this reason, at common law
criminal defamation encompassed obscenity and blasphemy. See 8
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 47, at 333, 337; LEVY, supra note 48, at 7. Criminal
defamation's application to obscenity and blasphemy is beyond the scope of this
Article.
50. Although I situate seditious libel as a branch of criminal defamation, I
do not doubt that the branch substantially shaped the entire tree. Still, it is
important to note that in theory, and occasionally in practice, criminal
prosecutions could be brought for libeling a private individual. See, e.g., State v.
Boogher, 3 Mo. App. 442 (1877) (exemplifying an American prosecution for
libeling a business corporation); Robert A. Leflar, The Social Utility of the
Criminal Law of Defamation, 34 TEX. L. REV. 984 1003-11 (1956) (discussing
criminal defamation prosecutions resulting from "private quarrels" and "gossip
... and general nastiness").
51. LEVY, supra note 48, at 8 (quoting WILLIAM HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE
CROWN (1716)).
52. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *150.
53. 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 47, at 337. In other words, criminal
defamation applied to libel and not to slander. Hence the name of the crime's
most noted branch was "seditious libel" rather than seditious defamation.
Written communication was defined broadly to include "printing, writing, signs,
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cut a broader swath.54  Criminal libel was more
encompassing than civil libel because criminal liability
attached to libelous remarks that were about deceased
people 55 and to remarks that were communicated only to
the defamed person. 56  In addition, criminal liability
attached to remarks that were critical of the government. 57
Finally, and most controversially, truth was not a defense
to a charge of criminal libel.58 Indeed, it was a maxim, if not
an actual doctrine, of criminal libel prosecutions that "the
greater the truth, the greater the libel."59
Beyond the important substantive differences with civil
libel, criminal libel was prosecuted through procedures that
were unique among criminal prosecutions. The most salient
or pictures." 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *150. It included manuscripts as
well as printed matter. See Hamburger, supra note 48, at 665, 691-92, 697-98,
726, 734.
54. For comparisons of civil and criminal defamation, see 8 HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 47, at 339, 347; R. C. Donnelly, History of Defamation, Wis. L. REV.
99, 115, 120 (1949); Leflar, supra note 50, at 1011-23; Clive Walker, Reforming
the Crime of Libel, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 169, 173-76 (2005).
55. See De Libellis Famosis, (1606) 77 Eng. Rep. 250, 251 (Star Chamber); 8
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 47, at 339. Civil libel protected only the living. Id. at
347; Leflar, supra note 50, at 1012, 1014.
56. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *151. Civil libel required
communication to a third party. See Leflar, supra note 50, at 1011-12; supra
text accompanying note 37.
57. 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 47, at 339-41; LEVY, supra note 48, at 8-10;
Hamburger, supra note 48, at 691, 695-97, 700-01, 734-35 (dating this
development to 1704). There was an overlap between criminal libel of
individuals and the government when the remarks concerned government
officials. However, criminal libel went further and punished remarks about the
government itself. For example, a remark that monarchy was not a good system
of government could be criminal, but not civil, libel. See Hamburger, supra note
48, at 694-96.
58. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *150-51; 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra
note 47, at 339; LEVY, supra note 48, at 12; Roy Robert Ray, Truth: A Defense to
Libel, 16 MINN. L. REV. 43, 43-47 (1932).
59. Walker, supra note 54, at 171 (attributing the remark to Lord
Mansfield). See also 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 194 (P.R.
Glazebrook ed., Profl Books Ltd. 1973) (1716) ("[I]t is far from being a
Justification of a Libel, that the Contents thereof are rrue [sic] . . . since the
greater Appearance there is of Truth in any malicious Invective, so much the
more provoking it is."); LEVY, supra note 48, at 12. Blackstone maintained that
truth might mitigate punishment. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *150. It was
undoubted doctrine, however, that libeling high ranking officials deserved
greater punishment than libeling other people. See De Libellis Famosis, (1606)
77 Eng. Rep. 250, 251 (Star Chamber).
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procedural difference was that the jury in criminal libel
prosecutions did not bring in a general verdict. In all other
criminal trials, although the jury might elect to bring in a
special verdict limited to declaring the facts of the case, it
had the uncontrollable right to declare generally that the
defendant was either guilty or not guilty.60 Juries had the
power "to decide the law" as well as the facts in criminal
prosecutions. 61 Their uncontrollable power to reach a
general verdict of acquittal was seen as "the strongest
safeguard available" for civil liberties. 62
In contrast, in criminal libel trials the jury's role was
confined to determining only two factual matters: did the
defendant publish the writing, and, if the writing contained
an innuendo, did the innuendo refer to the plaintiff.63
Judges determined if the writing was defamatory. 64 In
effect, juries in criminal libel prosecutions were limited to
bringing in "a special verdict finding certain facts. '65 There
is no disputing Leonard Levy's conclusion that "[a]t the trial
of a seditious libel, the defendant was not... judged by his
peers in any meaningful way. '66
Moreover, the fact that criminal libel was a
misdemeanor further diminished the role of Anglo-
American juries in libel prosecutions. Although defendants
might be pleased that felony penalties did not apply, 67
criminal libel's status as a misdemeanor also meant that
60. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *361-62. See also, Henderson, supra
note 41, at 329-30.
61. Henderson, supra note 41, at 328. See also Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries
as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARv. L. REv. 582, 582-88, 590-92 (1939).
62. Henderson, supra note 41, at 328 (speaking of free speech). A jury
verdict of guilty might be "mercifully set aside" but a verdict of not guilty
concluded the matter. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *361.
63. See Henderson, supra note 41, at 329. See also, 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra
note 47, at 342-45; LEVY, supra note 48, at 11.
64. See LEVY, supra note 48, at 11; Henderson, supra note 41, at 329.
65. Henderson, supra note 41, at 329. See also 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note
47, at 345 (saying criminal libel verdict "amounted merely to a special verdict
that a certain writing with a certain meaning had been published by the
accused").
66. LEVY, supra note 48, at 11.
67. The typical punishment for felony was death. As a misdemeanor, the
punishment for criminal libel was fine and imprisonment. Such punishments as
the pillory and mutilation had been abandoned by the eighteenth century. See 4
BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *17-19, *377-78.
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another fundamental civil liberty protection was
circumventable. Indictment by a grand jury was required
for felony prosecutions. For misdemeanors, information by
the Attorney General was a sufficient charging
instrument.68 Thus, in criminal libel prosecutions, the
ability of juries-whether grand or petit-to stand between
defendants and the government was substantially
diminished.
Diminished, however, was not the same as being
removed. Although juries in criminal libel trials were
instructed to find only the limited facts of publication and
innuendo, their formal verdict was in terms of guilty or not
guilty.69 Not often, but in a number of celebrated instances,
juries defied the judges' instructions and reported verdicts
of "not guilty" when the facts of publishing and innuendo
were clearly against the defendant. The Trial of the Seven
Bishops in England, and of John Peter Zenger in the
American colonies, are two of most famous instances of jury
nullification in Anglo-American law.7 0 They were not the
only defamation-related instances that were well-known at
the Founding.71
Still, the possibility of nullification by courageous juries
was insufficient to recommend the common law of criminal
defamation to eighteenth century English civil libertarians
and American patriots. At the Founding, seditious libel was
very controversial and on the cusp of substantial reform.7 2
68. See LEVY, supra note 48, at 11.
69. See Henderson, supra note 41, at 329-30. See also Stanley Nider Katz,
Introduction to JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF
JOHN PETER ZENGER 15-16, 21-23 (Stanley Nider Katz ed., Harvard Univ. Press
1963) (1736). Even if a jury brought in a verdict of "guilty of printing and
publishing," it was defective and did not convict the defendant. Id. at 101.
70. See Katz, supra note 69, (discussing the Zenger trial); LEVY, supra note
48, at 37-44 (same); Hamburger, supra note 48, at 699, 708-13 (discussing the
Seven Bishops' case); Henderson, supra note 41, at 330-31 (same). See also 10
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 47, at 674-76 (discussing other cases). The Seven
Bishops' case was not truly a case of jury nullification because of the split of
opinion among the four judges who presided at the trial. See Hamburger, supra
note 48, at 710-14. But it was a well-known example of the protective role juries
could play in defiance of judicial views and the desires of the government.
71. See Henderson, supra note 41, at 331-35 (discussing other cases,
including the Wilkes, Almon, and Miller cases from the 1770s, and the Shipley
case from the 1780s).
72. See LEVY, supra note 48, at 144-349 (recounting the Founding-era
controversy and reform movements).
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In the 1780s, although many lawyers and judges on both
sides of the Atlantic still supported the traditional common
law of seditious libel, 73 some libertarian thinkers already
had concluded that the whole concept of libeling the
government violated the freedom of speech that was
necessary for the proper functioning of politics in a
constitutional monarchy or republic. 74 More were to reach
this conclusion shortly after the adoption of the First
Amendment in reaction to the English suppression of
radicals sympathetic to the French Revolution, and the
Federalist Party's enactment and partisan enforcement of
the Sedition Act of 1798.75
Located somewhere between the extremes of complete
acceptance and complete rejection of the common law of
criminal defamation were many in the Founding generation
who accepted the concept of seditious libel but thought
three of its facets required reform. 76 Only one of their
suggested reforms was substantive. At trial, they wanted
defendants to be allowed to submit evidence of the truth of
their remarks. The reformers were split as to the effect of
establishing the truth of the supposedly defamatory
73. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *150-52; 10 HOLDSWORTH, supra
note 47, at 676-80 (discussing Chief Justice Mansfield and other judges); LEVY,
supra note 48, at 65-71, 147-48, 158 (discussing Massachusetts Chief Justice
Thomas Hutchinson, who was later the colony's Governor, the English
pamphleteer "Candor," who was a Gray's Inn lawyer, and Parliament's implicit
approval of Chief Justice Mansfield's views); David Jenkins, The Sedition Act of
1798 and the Incorporation of Seditious Libel into First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 45 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 154, 169-71 (2001) (discussing Federalist
arguments during the debates on the Sedition Act).
74. See LEVY, supra note 48, at 162, 208-09 (discussing an "unnamed
lawyer," in 1771, and Junius Wilkes, in 1782, as the first who rejected entirely
the concept of libeling the government); David M. Rabban, The Ahistorical
Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early American History,
37 STAN. L. REV. 795, 821-36 (1985) (discussing more evidence for a broad
freedom of speech at the Founding).
75. Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired 1801). See, e.g., LEVY, supra note 48,
at 282-349 (discussing James Madison, St. George Tucker, George Hay, Tunis
Wortman, and John Thompson among others); Rabban, supra note 74, at 834-
56. Not only its enforcement, but the Sedition Act itself was partisan, as
evidenced by the fact that it did not cover libels against the Vice-President, who
was a Republican, and was set to expire in 1801 when the enacting Congress
adjourned sine die. See Sedition Act §§ 2, 4.
76. See LEVY, supra note 48, at 171. See also 10 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 47,
at 680-89 (discussing the English reformers Lord Camden, Erskine, Burke, and
Wedderburn).
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remarks. Some said truth should be a complete defense;
others thought a complete defense should require both
truth and publication with good motives for justifiable ends;
others thought defendants should be allowed to submit
evidence of truth but leave it to the jury to determine its
legal import.77
The other reforms were procedural and focused on
augmenting the role of the jury: banning the initiation of
prosecutions through information, which would require
formal indictment by a Grand Jury; and allowing the trial
jury to determine the facts and the law of the case as in all
other criminal prosecutions.
For decades, historians have argued about the
implication of these debates for the original meaning of the
First Amendment.78 Certainly, the meaning of free speech
was in flux during the Founding era. In the late eighteenth
century, the Anglo-American world was emerging from a
conception of government in which the rulers were
considered "the superior of the subject" and establishing a
conception in which "the ruler is regarded as the agent and
servant, and the subject as the... master. '79 The eighteenth
century law of criminal defamation was a product of the
older view of the relation of government and citizen. Under
that view, affairs of state "are no Theames, or subjects fit
for vulgar persons, or common meetings. °80 With the new
conception "gathering strength during the later part of the
eighteenth century,"' the law of seditious libel "gradually
came to be wholly out of touch with current public
opinion. '8 2 By 1792, the year after the adoption of the First
Amendment, the reform position gained dominance.
77. See, e.g., Sedition Act § 3 (stating defendant may submit evidence of
truth); LEVY, supra note 48, at 199-200 (Judge Cushing suggesting and John
Adams agreeing that free speech requires that truth and publication "for the
public good" be a defense). In deciding the legal import juries might elect to
treat the evidence of truth as a justification which negatived liability, or only as
mitigation of the damages.
78. Compare LEVY, supra note 48, with Rabban, supra note 74.
79. 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 47, at 338 (quoting 2 JAMES FITZJAMES
STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 299-300 (1883)).
80. LEVY, supra note 48, at 4 (quoting King James I).
81. 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 47, at 338.
82. Id. at 345.
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England enacted Fox's Libel Act,8 3 which granted juries in
criminal libel trials the right to give a general verdict.8 4
America advanced more rapidly than England. In
America, within twenty years of the Founding, several
states, either by constitutional provision, statute, or judicial
decision, established that truth was a defense, when
published with good motives, and that juries were to judge
both the fact and law of the case.8 5 The federal government,
in the Sedition Act of 1798, also adopted these reforms.8 6
These post-ratification events may or may not be
sufficient to establish that the First Amendment, when it
was adopted in 1791, allowed prosecutions for seditious
libel but required that truth be a defense, when published
with good motives, and that juries have the power to give a
general verdict.8 7 In this period of rapid flux, legal
materials leave it somewhat ambiguous as to exactly where
83. 1792, 32 Geo. 3, c. 60 (Eng.).
84. See 10 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 47, at 688-92. As Holdsworth discusses,
the Act also allowed juries to bring in a special verdict if they chose, and it
preserved a defendant's right to appeal his conviction. Id. at 691. Thus
defendants had a double security-both a jury and the judiciary had to agree
that a conviction was warranted. It took until 1843, in Lord Campbell's Act, for
England to allow truth and publication for the public benefit as a defense to a
criminal libel charge. See The Libel Act, 1843, 6 & 7 Vict., c. 96, § 6 (Eng.).
85. See, e.g., PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 7; Commonwealth v. Morris, 3 Va.
(1 Va. Cas.) 176 (1811) (stating truth justifies libel of officials and mitigates
libels of private citizens); Commonwealth v. Clap, 4 Mass. (1 Tyng) 163 (1808)
(stating truth is a defense in cases involving public officials, candidates for
office, and public affairs); LEVY, supra note 48, at 339 (discussing New York
statute of 1805 which made the jury the judge of fact and law and provided that
truth was a defense when published "with good motives and for justifiable
ends"); Alfred H. Kelly, Constitutional Liberty and the Law of Libel: A
Historian's View, 74 AM. HIST. REv. 429, 432 (1968) (discussing the 1792
Kentucky and 1796 Tennessee constitutions). See also 2 JAMES KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 15-20 (Da Capo Press 1971) (1826-1830)
(describing the laws of three states and the federal government which provided
truth as a defense, and the laws of eleven states which provided for truth and
good motive as a defense).
86. See ch. 74, § 3 (1798). This was part of the Federalist argument for the
Act's propriety and constitutionality. Jenkins, supra note 73, at 165-66.
87. Today, truth is a complete defense. 1 SMOLLA, supra note 5, at §§ 5:3-
5:11. But there is no Supreme Court case requiring that juries be allowed to
give a general verdict. The last case, now over a half century old, upheld a
statute confining the jury to determining the fact of publication. See
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 265 n.20 (1952). See also People v.
Heinrich, 470 N.E.2d 966, 968, 971-72 (Ill. 1984) (requiring truth and
publication for good motives in libel of private figure).
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a constitutional majority of Framers and ratifiers stood in
1791. Also, the considerations I have discussed do not at all
include a review of the rather licentious press practices that
were actually permitted. The law in the books may well
have been more restrictive and outdated than the law in
action.8 8
But if what I have recounted is not sufficient to
establish that at the Founding constitutional norms
required full jury participation when the government
criminally sanctioned speech, it does establish that there
was a substantial and soon to be successful movement
protesting the jury's limited role. It illustrates a substantial
appreciation of, and a demand for, significant jury
participation in judicial sanctions of defamation.
In sum, in contrast to the civil law of defamation, the
eighteenth century criminal law of defamation was highly
controversial. The unique configuration of judge-jury
relations in criminal libel prosecutions was at the heart of
the controversy. In the late eighteenth century, punishing
speech without full jury participation was an anachronism.
In both England and America, "it was quite inconsistent
with prevalent political ideas and prevalent public
opinion."8 9
2. Prior Restraint-Licensing By the Crown, Parliament,
and Common Law Courts. At the Founding, the law
regarding prior restraint was generally agreed upon. Like
civil defamation, it was uncontroversial. It was simply and
famously stated by Blackstone. "The liberty of the press," he
said, requires "laying no previous restraints upon
publications.... Every freeman has an undoubted right to
lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid
this, is to destroy the freedom of the press."90
88. See LEVY, supra note 48, at 9 (commenting that since the early
eighteenth century "[a]s a matter of practice [the press] was remarkably free
and unrestrained; prosecutions tended to be selective and exemplary. Judicial
standards probably did not coincide with popular ones"); Rabban, supra note 74,
at 821-36 (contrasting legal and popular attitudes).
89. 10 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 47, at 673.
90. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *151-52. The English bar on prior
restraints, during America's Founding era, appeared to be absolute. Even the
practice of restraining speech that interfered with the administration of justice,
as opposed to imposing subsequent punishment for it, did not develop until the
early nineteenth century. See W. BLAKE ODGERS, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF LIBEL
AND SLANDER 337-38 (London, Stevens & Sons 2d ed. 1887) [hereinafter ODGERS
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In the twentieth century, some Justices and scholars
have maintained that Blackstone's proscription of prior
restraints was limited to a ban on administrative
licensing.91 Their view is grounded in the fact that most of
the English and colonial experience of prior restraints was
with either royally or legislatively authorized censors. 92
But the founding generation understood Blackstone as
writing about a ban on pre-clearance from any government
official-executive, legislative, or judicial. As Jean Louis De
Lolme, a Swiss-born political philosopher and commentator
on the English constitution, maintained:
The liberty of the press, as established in England, consists
therefore (to define it more precisely) in this, that neither the
courts of justice, nor any other judges whatever, are authorized to
take notice of writings intended for the press, but are confined to
those which are actually printed, and must, in these cases, proceed
by the trial by jury.9 3
De Lolme, who emigrated to England in 1769 and
became a naturalized subject, published his analysis of The
Constitution of England in 1771. 94 Originally written in
French, it was translated into English in 1775. De Lolme's
masterwork went through four English editions before his
death in 1807 and five more by the 1850s. 95 He was widely
read and highly regarded both in England and America at
the Founding and throughout the early nineteenth
century.96
2d ed.] (citing no case earlier than the nineteenth century).
91. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 733-36 (1931) (Butler, J.,
dissenting); Jeffries, supra note 19, at 417-18, 426; Mayton, supra note 19, 247-
49.
92. The history of royal and legislative licensing is recounted in FREDRICK
SEATON SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND 1476-1776, 41-63, 180-201,
216-59 (1965). See also Hamburger, supra note 48, at 674-91. Ecclesiastical
authority to license books passed to the Crown with the reformation. SIEBERT,
supra, at 41-47; Hamburger, supra, at 671. At different times, monopoly and
taxation were also means of prior restraint. SIEBERT, supra, at 64-87, 303-22.
They will not be discussed in this Article.
93. JEAN LOUIS DE LOLME, THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND 288 (Baldwin &
Co. 1821) (1775).
94. The biographical and bibliographical material in this paragraph is
drawn from 5 DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 775-77 (1921).
95. There was also a German translation. Id. at 776.
96. See Meyerson, supra note 11, at 312-13 (discussing, inter alia, John
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In explicitly stating that England's ban on prior
restraints extended to "courts of justice [and] other
judges, '97 De Lolme was drawing from historic experience
well known to the Founding generation. The Founders
certainly knew of the long struggle against Crown and
Parliamentary censors, and celebrated the abolition of the
"odious" Court of the Star Chamber in 1642, and the final
"expir[ation]" of the Licensing Act in 1695, as major steps
toward establishing speech and press freedoms as a
constitutional norm. 98 They also knew that in the politically
tense years leading up to the Glorious Revolution, the
notorious Chief Justice William Scroggs 99 had asserted, in
Henry Carr's Case,100 that the King's Bench had common
Adams and St. George Tucker's praise for De Lolme). Later in the century,
Joseph Story, for example, drew from De Lolme in discussing freedom of speech
in 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
737 (1833). So did Thomas McIntyre Cooley in THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE
ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 420 (1868). De Lolme is cited or discussed
respectfully in eleven American cases between 1800 and 1860. Westlaw,
http://www.westlaw.com (search the databases "allstates" and "allfeds" for the
term "Lolme") (last visited July 23, 2007).
97. DE LOLME, supra note 93, at 288.
98. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *152 n.(a). See also LEVY, supra note
48, at 302-04 (indicating that some Founders thought the abolition of licensing
was sufficient to establish press freedoms, while others thought it was not
enough). Blackstone took the end of royal and legislative licensing as
establishing freedom of the press. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra; Pound, supra note 17,
at 650 (referring to "writers at the end of the eighteenth century"). Odgers
thought it took until the enactment of Fox's Libel Act, in 1792, with its
assurance of full jury participation. W. BLAKE ODGERS, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF
LIBEL AND SLANDER 12 (London, Stevens & Sons 1st ed. 1881) [hereinafter
ODGERS 1st ed.]. St. George Tucker, and others, thought these two events were
insufficient and that more restrictions on subsequent punishments were
required. LEVY, supra note 48, at 325-32 (discussing St. George Tucker, Tunis
Wortman, and Thomas Cooper). The point is that, in both England and
America, the events described here were well-known and appreciated as
milestones.
99. 2 JOHN CAMPBELL, THE LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 250-53
(3d ed. 1874) [hereinafter CAMPBELL, JUSTICES]. For a description of Scroggs's
character, see 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 47, at 505. In Carr's Case, Scroggs
was assisted by soon to be the equally notorious George Jefferies in his capacity
as Recorder. See Trial of Henry Carr, or Care, at the Guildhall of London, for a
Libel (1680), in 7 CORBEIT'S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 1111, 1114
(1810) [hereinafter Trial of Henry Carr]. For a description of Jefferies'
reputation and character, see 3 JOHN CAMPBELL, THE LIVES OF THE LORD
CHANCELLORS AND KEEPERS OF THE GREAT SEAL OF ENGLAND 497 (2d ed. 1846); 6
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 47, at 505, 527-30.
100. Trial of Henry Carr, supra note 99, at 1111.
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law authority to issue a "rule of [the] court"'01 restraining
Carr from publishing his newspaper, The Weekly Pacquet of
Advice from Rome, or the History of Popery.102 Parliament's
reaction was swift. Within a year, Scroggs's assertion of
preventive power became an article in his impeachment. 103
Scroggs's "rule," the House of Commons said, was "contrary
to all justice, in condemning... all that might for the future
be written on that subject;... an open invasion of upon the
right of the subject, and an encroaching and assuming... a
legislative power and authority."'10 4
In the eighteenth century, then, with the expiration of
the licensing system standing for the principle that neither
the King nor Parliament had pre-publication censorial
power,105 and with Scroggs's impeachment standing for the
proposition that common law courts also lacked preventive
power, 0 6 the only official who might pretend to preventive
101. See Proceedings against Lord Chief Justice Scroggs before the Privy
Council; and against the said Lord Chief Justice and other Judges in
Parliament (1680), in 8 CORBETT'S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS, 163,
198 (1810) [hereinafter Proceedings].
102. See id. at 186-87, 198; SIEBERT, supra note 92, at 272-73, 297-98;
Hamburger, supra note 48, at 687-89. Hamburger's discussion is particularly
insightful, showing that when Carr's case arose, Parliament's licensing statute
had temporarily lapsed. Scroggs, with support from the other common law
judges, asserted that publication of news required a license as a matter of
common law. He entered the order prohibiting future publication of the paper
before any trial. See id. at 685-88.
103. See Proceedings, supra note 101, at 198-99. Though impeached by the
House, Scroggs was never convicted by the House of Lords because of
Parliament's dissolution. Scroggs was removed from the Bench later that year.
3 CAMPBELL, JUSTICES, supra note 99, at 267-70.
104. Proceedings, supra note 101, at 198-99. The same Article impeached
Scroggs for proceeding against Carr "without hearing the parties." Id.
Significantly, the House of Commons did not impeach Scroggs for the claim
that, at common law, publication of news required royal license. In other words,
prior restraint by administrative license and subsequent punishment for
publishing without one did not bother the House; the assertion of judicial
authority to issue preventive rules did.
105. 4 Blackstone, supra note 36, at *152 n.(a); Meyerson, supra note 11, at
305-06. There were exceptions allowing Parliament to protect its privileges
without resort to jury trial, see LEVY, supra note 48, at 14, and Courts to
summarily punish contempts even when based on out of court publications. See
JOHN C. Fox, THE HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 2, 4, 111-17 (1972) (arguing
that a case in 1721 is the earliest instance of such summary punishment). The
first equity case summarily punishing out of court publications is discussed
infra text accompanying notes 192-99.
106. Part of the notoriety of Scroggs's "rule" in Carr's Case was that issuing
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authority was the Chancellor when presiding in the High
Court of Chancery.
B. Injunctions for Defamation.
Eighteenth century Chancellors asserted jurisdiction to
restrain publications in one area: they enjoined writings
that infringed copyright 10 7 whether based on statute,
common law, or the Crown's or Parliament's prerogative
monopolies over publishing on certain subjects.'08
Injunctions were issued, however, only when the
infringement was clear in deference to the growing
insistence on juries having a role in speech controversies. 10 9
Beyond copyright, eighteenth century Chancellors
exercised no preventive power over publications. 1 0 In a
preventive orders, rather than imposing a subsequent punishment for
publishing without a license, was something even the Star Chamber never did.
See, e.g., ROBERT EDEN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS 317 (1821)
[hereinafter EDEN 1st ed.] (citing WILLIAM HUDSON, A TREATISE OF THE COURT OF
THE STAR CHAMBER (ca. 1635)); JOHN TOWNSHEND, A TREATISE ON THE WRONGS
CALLED SLANDER AND LIBEL 351 (2d ed. 1872) [hereinafter TOWNSHEND 2d ed.];
Pound, supra note 17, at 650 (citing Hudson and other sources). But see
Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige Ch. 24, 26 (N.Y. Ch. 1839) (saying the Star
Chamber "was undoubtedly in the habit of restraining... libels by injunction");
ODGERS 1st ed., supra note 98, at 13 (stating that the Star Chamber
"occasionally restrained" publication of allegedly "seditious works");
Proceedings, supra note 101, at 165 (Lord North stating that the Star Chamber
made "provisionary orders"); Pound, supra, at 650 (giving different reasons for
the notoriety of Scroggs's rule).
107. EDEN 1st ed., supra note 106, at 264-69.
108. See id. at 264-84. The royal and legislative rights discussed here are
only loosely called copyright. The Crown and Parliament had the exclusive
privilege to print certain material. See id. at 269-72. Parliament's control over
the reporting of its debates, when justified as a right to have its activities secret
or reported accurately, trenched on restraining printing as a contempt. See
Gurney v. Longman, (1807) 33 Eng. Rep. 379, 383-85 (Ch.); infra text
accompanying notes 192-99 (discussing contempt by publication).
109. EDEN 1st ed., supra note 106, at 284-87 (discussing the rule and Eldon's
modification of it in the nineteenth century). If not clear, equity would wait for
law to determine that the publication was a copyright infringement. Id. at 285.
110. See, e.g., id. at 316 (indicating that equity restrains publications only
on the ground of "property and copyright"). Equity, along with the common law
courts, did subject some out-of-court publications to summary punishment as
contempts of court. See Fox, supra note 105, at 2, 4, 101-03, 111-17; Walter
Nelles & Carol King, Contempt by Publication in the United States To the
Federal Contempt Statute, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 401, 401-13 (1928). By the early
nineteenth century equity enjoined publishing letters which involved breaches
of trust or fraud. EDEN 1st ed., supra note 106, at 279.
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century filled with libel suits, both civil and criminal, the
general absence of equity cases discussing whether equity
might enjoin libelous publications reflects an assumption
that it had no such jurisdiction.1 1' John Eden, the author of
the first treatise on the law of injunctions, thought so. 112
Writing in 1821, he raised the question of equity's power to
enjoin libel and said: "So little has it even been supposed
that such a jurisdiction.., belonged to the court of Chancery,
that it would be difficult to find any authority in which it
has been in terms denied."113
Supporting Eden's view is the fact that when the
matter was settled in England, it was by "offhand
remarks"114 made by Chancellor Eldon "[i]n the course of a
colloquy with counsel"115 in Gee v Pritchard,116 an 1818 case
In the nineteenth century the summary punishment of contempt cases gave
rise to cases, in law and equity, in which courts issued preventive orders to
preserve the parties ability have to a fair trial. See, e.g., The King v. Clement,
(1821) 106 Eng. Rep. 918, 921-23 (K.B.). As far as I can discover, these
preventive orders date from the early nineteenth century; they were not an
eighteenth century, or pre-Founding, development. Even if they were, they were
seen as part of the courts' inherent contempt power, not the power to enjoin
libel.
Equity also involved itself in assessing the content of publication by refusing
to protect libelous publications from copyright infringement. See Southey v.
Sherwood, (1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1008 (Ch.); 10 JOHN CAMPBELL, THE LIVES
OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS AND KEEPERS OF THE GREAT SEAL OF ENGLAND 254-59
(5th ed. 1868) (criticizing Chancellor Eldon for originating the rule "by which he
erected himself into a Censor of the Press, and gave himself the power to
protect or to extinguish all literary property at his pleasure"). Although this
rule permitted rather than restrained publication, it did involve the Chancellor
in assessing the content of a book on grounds other than copyright.
Nonetheless, the rule was a nineteenth, not an eighteenth, century
development. See id.
111. I say "general absence" because there are two cases that may be taken
as addressing the point. See infra text accompanying notes 148-212 (discussing
the cases).
112. EDEN 1st ed., supra note 106. There are no earlier treatises on the
subject in the Harvard University HOLLIS Catalogue. See also CHARLES
STEWART DREWRY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INJUNCTIONS iii
(1841) (saying the topic "has only been treated by one learned writer, and that
was more than twenty years ago").
113. EDEN 1st ed., supra note 106, at 317. I am reminded of a remark Lon
Fuller made during the semester I studied jurisprudence with him, something
to the effect that: some of the most basic principles are never litigated because
no one thinks to violate them.
114. Pound, supra note 17, at 645.
115. Id. at 642.
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involving a request for an injunction to restrain the
recipient of "private and confidential" letters from
publishing them. 117  In the course of argument, the
defendant's attorney made the claim that not even the Star
Chamber restrained the publication of letters "unless the
publication was libelous."118 Interrupting him, evidently to
indicate that it was unnecessary to argue that the letters in
Gee were not defamatory, Eldon said: "It will not be
necessary to trouble you with that view of the case. The
publication of a libel is a crime; and I have no jurisdiction to
prevent the commission of crimes....",,9
Casual dicta like Eldon's could determine such an
important point only if there was a predisposition to the
position,1 20  an understanding that it reflected long-
standing, if unwritten, commitments. 121
Despite these considerations, Roscoe Pound, in his
article criticizing the traditional rule that equity lacked
power to enjoin libel, concluded that before Gee "foreclosed
the matter... it was by no means settled by authority."' 22
Pound based his analysis on three precedents: Du Bost v.
Beresford,123  Burnett v. Chetwood,124  and Roach v.
116. (1818) 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (Ch.).
117. Gee was decided on the basis of the copyright retained by the author of
a letter. Gee, 36 Eng. Rep. at 670, 678; Pound, supra note 17, at 642-44
(criticizing Eldon's use of this principle).
118. Gee, 36 Eng. Rep. at 674. It is not clear that even the Star Chamber
restrained the publication of libel rather than punishing it. See supra note 106
(discussing whether the Star Chamber restrained publications).
119. Gee, 36 Eng. Rep. at 674 (also, in response to the argument that
publication of the letters "will be painful to the feelings of the Plaintiff," Eldon
said "I will relieve you also from that argument. The question will be, whether
the bill has stated facts of which the Court can take notice, as a case of civil
property, which it is bound to protect").
120. Eldon made similar remarks the year earlier in Southey v. Sherwood,
(1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1007 (Ch.) (saying, inter alia, "The Court does not
interfere in the way of Injunction to punish or to prevent injuries done to the
character of individuals; but it leaves the party to his remedy at law"). Eldon's
remarks in Southey were cited by Eden as one of the rare examples of equity
denying, albeit in dicta, that it had power to enjoin libel. EDEN 1st ed., supra
note 106, at 317-18.
121. Precedents holding that equity had no power to enjoin libel date from
1841 in England and 1839 in America. Seeley v. Fisher, (1841) 59 Eng. Rep. 998
(Ch.); Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige Ch. 24 (N.Y. Ch. 1839).
122. Pound, supra note 17, at 645.
123. (1810) 170 Eng. Rep. 1235 (Nisi Prius) (many citations spell the
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Garvan.125
1. Du Bost v. Beresford. Du Bost was an action at law
for damages and lost profits.126 The plaintiff was an "artist
of considerable eminence" who had painted a picture that
was "a scandalous libel upon a gentleman of fashion and his
lady."'127 He was exhibiting the picture for a paid
admission. 128 "Great crowds went daily to see it" until the
defendant, who was the lady's brother, came to the
exhibition and cut the painting to pieces. 129 Chief Justice
Ellenborough presided at the trial where the question arose
as to whether the damages should include the sizable lost
profits from the picture's exhibition or be limited to the
"value of the canvas and paint which formed" the picture. 130
In the course of determining that the jury should consider
only the lower value, Ellenborogh said, "If [the painting]
was a libel upon the persons introduced into it, the law
cannot consider it valuable as a picture. Upon an
application to the Lord Chancellor, he would have granted
an injunction against its exhibition."131
To Pound, Ellenborough's comment "shows what some
lawyers... thought" in 1810 when the case was decided.132
To be sure, what some lawyers thought in 1810,
particularly those of Ellenborough's age, is not entirely
irrelevant to determining the understanding of the
Founding generation.133
Unfortunately for Pound's argument, Ellenborough's
dicta in Du Bost was generally thought to be wholly
plaintiffs name "Dubost").
124. (1720) 35 Eng. Rep. 1008 (Ch.).
125. (1742) 26 Eng. Rep. 683 (Ch.) (also known as The St. James's Evening
Post Case, Huggonson's Case, Huggin's Case, and Roach v. Read). The case is
also reported at 21 Eng. Rep. 480.
126. Du Bost v. Beresford, (1810) 170 Eng. Rep. 1235 (K.B.).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Pound, supra note 17, at 645.
133. Pound was not particularly focused on the Founding generation. He
was not an originalist. See supra text accompanying note 24.
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inaccurate. Ellenborough was known to make incorrect
rulings and ill-considered statements when conducting
trials.13 4 John Campbell, who was later to be Chief Justice
and Chancellor, was Ellenborough's Nisi Prius reporter
from 1807 to 1816.135 He tells us that Ellenborough enjoyed
a high reputation as a trial court judge because Campbell,
as court reporter, "suppress[ed] his bad decisions."136
"Before each number was sent to press," Campbell said, "I
carefully revised all the cases I had collected for it, and
rejected such as were inconsistent with former decisions or
recognized principles. When I arrived at the end of my
fourth and last volume, I had a whole drawer full of 'bad
Ellenborough law."1 37
Although Campbell published Du Bost, he was later, as
Lord Chancellor, to officially rule "without hesitation...
that Lord Ellenborough was wrong when he laid down in
Dubost v. Beresford, that 'the Lord Chancellor would grant
an injunction against the exhibition of a libellous
picture."'138
Moreover, Ellenborough's "characteristic dictum"'139 was
not well received when he made it. In 1816, Thomas Howell
published a note in his State Trials series reporting that:
I have been informed by very high authority, that the
promulgation of [Ellenborough's] doctrine relating to the Lord
Chancellor's injunction excited great astonishment in the minds of
all the practitioners of the courts of equity, and I had apprehended
that this must have happened; since I believe there is not to be
found in the books any decision or any dictum, posterior to the
134. See Letter from John Campbell to his Brother (Jan. 1, 1808), in 1 LIFE
OF JOHN, LORD CAMPBELL 217-18 (Mary Hardcastle ed., 2d ed. 1881) (saying
Ellenborough "is apt occasionally to blunder") [hereinafter AUTOBIOGRAPHY]. Cf.
Anonymous, Literary Property, 38 EDINBURGH REV. 281, 283-84 (1823)
(discussing another judge's Nisi Prius dictum saying "it has been said by nearly
every Judge in the Courts of Common Law, that they wished the decisions of
Judges at Nisi Prius, from the small deliberation which could be bestowed in
making them, were never cited in argument").
135. As Ellenborough was Chief Justice from 1802 to 1818, Campbell
reported Ellenborough's Nisi Prius decisions for most of Ellenborough's tenure.
There are no other reports of Ellenborough's trials.
136. 1 AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 134, at 215.
137. Id.
138. The Emperor of Austria v. Day, (1861) 45 Eng. Rep. 861, 870 (Ch.
App.).
139. Pound, supra note 17, at 645.
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days of the Star Chamber, from which such doctrine can be
deduced, either directly, or by inference or analogy: unless indeed
we are to except the proceedings of Lord Ellenborough's
predecessor Scroggs and his associates, in the case of Henry
Care. 140
Robert Eden, in his 1821 treatise, also described
Ellenborough's remark as "a hasty dictum" that is
"obviously erroneous."141  Additionally, an anonymous
commentator in the May 1823, issue of the Edinburgh
Review disapproved Ellenborough's remark as showing
"more ignorance than can be well understood in a lawyer
upon a point of constitutional law."'142 Throughout the
century, commentators on the law of libel echoed Howell's
and Eden's reception of Ellenborough's remark. 143
Due to its adverse reception, and not because it post-
dates the Framing, we should set aside Ellenborough's
comment. 44 Historically, it served to provoke Thomas
Howell and Robert Eden to deny that equity had any such
power. 45  Given its timing and notoriety,1 46  perhaps
Ellenborough's dictum also served to provoke Chancellor
Eldon's casual comment in Gee v. Pritchard which settled
the rule that equity had no power to enjoin libel.147
140. Proceedings Against John Horne, Clerk, on an Information in the
King's-Bench by the Attorney-General, for a Libel (1777), in 20 STATE TRIALS 799
(1810).
141. EDEN 1st ed., supra note 106, at 315-16.
142. Anon., supra note 134, at 309.
143. See ODGERS 1st ed., supra note 98, at 13-14 (describing the remark as
"mere obiter dictum"); THOMAS STARKIE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SLANDER,
LIBEL, SCANDALUM MAGNATUM AND FALSE RuMouRs 143 n.1 (1826) (saying "The
hasty dictum of Lord Ellenborough is not the doctrine of the court of Chancery
in England"). See also Mulkern v. Ward, (1872) 13 L.R.Eq. 619, 621 (Ch.)
(disapproving Ellenborough's remark as "inconsistent" with nineteenth-century
equity precedent).
144. Pound, who knew of Howell's remark, discounted it as "probably
apocryphal." Pound, supra note 17, at 646 n.17.
145. See EDEN 1st ed., supra note 106, at 315-16; supra text accompanying
note 140 (discussing Thomas Howell's reaction to Ellenborough's comment).
146. See supra text accompanying note 140 (discussing Thomas Howell's
reaction to Ellenborough's comment); see also EDEN 1st ed., supra note 106, at
315 (saying Ellenborough's claim "attracted considerable attention").
147. It is curious, and I suggest not coincidental, that Eldon's two dicta date
from 1817 and 1818, see infra text accompanying notes 114-19 (discussing Gee)
and note 120 (discussing Southey), about the same time as Howell's and
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2. Burnett v. Chetwood. Burnett v. Chetwood148 was an
equity proceeding in 1720 in which the executor of a
deceased author of two books that had been written in
Latin sought to enjoin the publication of their English
translation. 149 One of the books, De Statu Mortuorum, had
never been published, so the plaintiff had a claim based on
the decedent's common law right of perpetual copyright for
unpublished work.150 Burnett was among the earliest cases
to consider whether common law copyright survived the
recently enacted Copyright Act.' 5' The other book,
Archoeologia Philosophica, had been published. 152 Thus
Burnett v. Chetwood was also the earliest case in which an
English court addressed the controversial issue of whether
under the Copyright Act translations were copies or a
separate original work.153
Chancellor Parker (later Lord Maccelsfield) enjoined
the translation of both books.154 What makes Parker's
decision relevant to our topic is the reason Parker gave for
enjoining the translation of the previously published
Archoeologia Philosophica. According to the report, Parker
leaned to the view that translations were not copyright
violations "on account that the translator has bestowed his
care and pains upon it."'155 Yet Parker granted the
Ellenborough's remarks.
148. (1720) 35 Eng. Rep. 1008 (Ch.).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1009. On common law copyright for unpublished work in the first
half of the eighteenth century, see Tonson v. Walker, (1752) 36 Eng. Rep. 1017,
1020 (Ch.) (discussing earlier cases); EDEN 1st ed., supra note 106, at 275-76;
BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 12, 84 (1967).
151. Burnett may also have been the earliest post-Statute of Anne case to
consider the survival of common law copyright for unpublished work. See
Tonson, 36 Eng. Rep. at 1018 (discussing common law copyright for
unpublished work after the Statute of Anne and citing no case earlier than
1732); EDEN 1st ed., supra note 106, at 275-76 (same).
152. Burnett, 35 Eng. Rep. at 1009. The book was also called Archoeologia
Sacra. Id. at 1008.
153. See KAPLAN, supra note 150, at 9-10 (discussing the case). On the
controverted law of copyright in translations, see JAMES HIGH, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS 382-83 (1st ed. 1873); Erik Ketzan, Rebuilding Babel:
Copyright and the Future of Online Machine Translation, 9 TUL. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 205, 207-09 (2007).
154. Burnett, 35 Eng. Rep. at 1010.
155. Id. at 1009.
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injunction on the grounds that Archoeologia Philosophica
was
a book which to his knowledge (having read it in his study),
contained strange notions, intended by the author to be concealed
from the vulgar in the Latin language, in which language it could
not do much hurt, the learned being better able to judge of it, he
thought it proper to grant an injunction to the printing and
publishing it in English; that he lookt upon it, that this Court had
a superintendency over all books, and might in a summary way
restrain the printing or publishing any that contained reflections
on religion or morality. 15 6
Chancellor Parker's comments clearly claim that equity
may restrain libels. 157 Still, they should be set aside
because: (1) they were not published until some time
between 1817 and 1819 and were wholly unknown to the
Founding generation and; (2) when finally published, their
hostile reception, coupled with the utter lack of any similar
precedent or dictum throughout the eighteenth century,
indicates that Parker's view had little to no traction in the
wider legal and political culture. 158
As for Burnett's delayed publication: Burnett v.
Chetwood first appeared in volume two of John Merivale's
Reports, published sometime between 1817 and 1819,159 as
a note to Chancellor Eldon's decision in Southey v.
Sherwood.160 At the note's beginning, Merivale explained
156. Id.
157. That only religion and morality are instanced does not seem of
moment. Neither does it matter, for my purposes, whether Parker's remarks,
which "travel out of the record," should be considered obiter dicta for that
reason. See Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 206 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No.
13,514).
158. As the following paragraphs detail, my argument is not simply based
on the secrecy of the decision, but on the secrecy combined with its hostile
reception. Cf. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 26, at 1146-48 (arguing that the
views the Framers expressed in secret during the drafting convention is
relevant to the Constitution's original meaning as they are evidence of the
document's public meaning).
159. See 2 JOHN HERMAN MERIVALE, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND
DETERMINED IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY 441-44 (1818). See also CHARLES
SOULE, THE LAWYER'S REFERENCE MANUAL OF LAw BOOKS AND CITATIONS 75
(1883).
160. (1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1006 (Ch.). Most likely, Merivale appended Burnett
to Southey because it contrasted nicely with Eldon's dicta in Southey
disclaiming equity's jurisdiction to enjoin libel. See supra note 120 (discussing
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that a Mr. Blackburne had taken the report from a
manuscript "volume of cases, probably collected by Mr.
Emlyn" who was defendant's counsel in Burnett.16 ' Telling
evidence that few if any people knew of the report of
Burnett contained in Mr. Emlyn's manuscript is that, so far
as I can tell, there is not a single citation or reference to it
prior to Merivale's publishing it as a note to Southey. 162 The
scholarly barrister Thomas Howell certainly was unaware
of it in 1816, when he wrote his note criticizing
Ellenborough for suggesting that equity might enjoin
libels.163
This is not to say that Burnett v. Chetwood was entirely
unknown in the eighteenth century. In 1752, in Tonson v.
Walker,64 Chancellor Hardwicke referred to the "case[]... of
Dr. Burnett's treatise de Statu morturoum in Lord
[Parker's] time" as illustrating the law of copyright for
unpublished books. 165 Significantly, Hardwicke referred
only to the De Statu book and not to Archoeologia
Philosophica. The importance of this observation emerges if
we consider the structure of the report Merivale published
in 1817.
In Merivale's volume, the report of Burnett v. Chetwood
Southey).
161. Burnett, 35 Eng. Rep. at 1008.
162. See also 10 JOHN LORD CAMPBELL, LIvEs OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS AND
KEEPERS OF THE GREAT SEAL OF ENGLAND 259 (5th ed. 1868) (describing the case
as "recently ... discovered").
163. See A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS, supra note 99, at 799
(saying "there is not to be found in the books any decision or any dictum
supporting Ellenborough's claim since Chief Justice Scroggs left the bench");
supra text accompanying note 140.
164. (1752) 36 Eng. Rep. 1017 (Ch.). Tonson was also belatedly published. It
is contained in the Appendix to the third volume of Clement Swanston's reports
on Cases Argued and Determined in the High Court of Chancery During the
Time of Lord Chancellor Eldon, which was published sometime between 1821
and 1827. See 3 CLEMENT TUDWAY SWANSTON, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND
DETERMINED IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY 672-82 (1827); SOULE, supra note
159, at 75. Although Swanston's Reports contain cases decided between 1818 to
1821, the Appendix covers cases dating from 1673 to 1792. SOULE, supra, at 79
n.32. That the only case referencing Burnett that was decided before the
Founding also happened to be published after the Founding era has no
relevance to the point I will be making.
165. Tonson, 36 Eng. Rep. at 1020. Demonstrating the belated publication of
Tonson, Chancellor Hardwicke's remark is followed by a citation to Burnett v.
Chetwood in Merivale's Reports. Id. at 1020. That anachronism was an editor's
emendation.
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has two parts.16 6 The first is Mr. Emlyn's notes; the second
is the official memorial of the case copied from the
"register's book" in Chancery.167 Mr. Emlyn's notes
metioned and concern only the Archoeologia book even
when stating the case's facts. 168 Essentially, Emlyn, who
was the defendant's counsel, 16 9 covers only his argument
and Parker's opinion concerning Archoeologia Philosophica,
the book that had been published. 170 The entry in the
Register's Book, in contrast, relates in detail the facts
concerning both books and that "upon hearing of what was
alleged on both sides, His Lordship doth order, that an
Injunction be awarded against the Defendants" to restrain
the printing, translating, or selling of either book. 171 As
would be expected, the Registrar's official memorial does
not mention the grounds for Parker's decision, it reports
only the facts and the result.172
Apparently, Chancellor Hardwicke could have known of
Burnett v. Chetwood from the Register's Book, to which he
had constant access. Reference to unreported cases that
were in the Register's Book was commonplace in the era
before official court reporting. 173 Conversely, perusal of Mr.
166. Burnett v. Chetwood, (1720) 35 Eng. Rep 1008, (Ch.).
167. See id. at 1008-10. The break between the two parts is on page 1009.
168. See id. at 1008-09.
169. See id. at 1008.
170. See id. at 1008-09. See also Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 204
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514) (per counsel) (making this observation). This
makes sense as the question whether copyright extended to preventing
translations of books that had been published was the difficult part of the case.
It is the part of the case a practitioner would be interested in memorializing for
himself.
171. Burnett, 35 Eng. Rep. at 1010 (Ch.).
172. The defining characteristic of books that we call 'law reports" are that
they contain a "reporto of what was said in court," while the Register's Book
does not. Michael Macnair, The Nature and Function of the Early Chancery
Reports, in LAW REPORTING IN BRITAIN 123, 125-28 (Chantal Stebbings ed.,
1995). The Register's Book is the official minutes, composed by the clerks, of the
pleadings and the judgment. See 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 422 (A.L. Goodhard & H.G. Hanbury eds., 1966); see also 9
WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 366-68 (A.L. Goodhard &
H.G. Hanbury eds., 1966).
173. In Tonson, for example, Hardwicke also refers to similarly unreported
"cases of Mr. Webb [and] Mr. Forester." Tonson v. Walker, (1752) 35 Eng. Rep.
1017, 1020 (Ch.). It is telling that in Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201,
216 (K.B.), when Justice Willes discusses the unreported Webb and Forrester
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Emlyn's manuscript, if that were possible, would not have
provided Hardwicke with any knowledge that the case
involved Burnett's unpublished De Statu book.
Thus Hardwicke's reference to the "casen... of Dr.
Burnett's treatise de Statu mortuorum" does not establish
any knowledge of Mr. Emlyn's manuscript report of
Parker's opinion. 174 Harwicke's reference is accounted for by
the likelihood that he drew from the Register's Book, a
record that contained no mention of Parker's
breathtakingly broad rationale for enjoining the translating
or printing of Burnett's other book, the already published
Archoeologia Philosophica. In sum, despite Chancellor
Hardwicke's comments in Tonson v. Walker, it is fair to say
that there is not a single reference to Parker's opinion in
Burnett v. Chetwood prior to 1817. Certainly, the Founding
generation had no knowledge of it.
As for the case's hostile reception: Burnett v. Chetwood's
hostile reception commenced with John Merivale, who
published the case with a prefatory note saying Burnett
"may be considered as somewhat curious with reference to
the principles upon which [it] was decided." 175 Robert Eden
continued that criticism two years later when, in the first
scholarly mention of Burnett, he said:
There is, perhaps, but one instance in the books, of any judge
having maintained the existence of a power in the Court of
Chancery of restraining publications on any other ground, but that
of property and copyright; and it was then done in language so
strange and unconstitutional, as to carry with it, its own
refutation. 176
Chancellor Campbell, as he had with Du Bost, had "no
cases he describes only the facts and the result. When he discusses Pope v. Curl,
(1741) 26 Eng. Rep. 608 (Ch.), and The Duke of Queensbury v. Shebbeare, (1758)
28 Eng. Rep. 924 (Ch.), which were reported, Willes mentions the Court's
reasoning as well as the facts and outcome even though he does not cite the
reports themselves. Millar, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 216 (K.B.)
174. Tonson, 35 Eng. Rep. at 1020.
175. Southey v. Sherwood, (1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1008 (Ch.) (referring to
Burnett v. Chetwood, 35 Eng. Rep. 1008 (Ch.)).
176. EDEN 1st ed., supra note 106, at 316; see also Anon., supra note 134, at
309 (Eden's contemporary referring to Parker as Lord Macclesfield and saying
he "has left, in curious language, the first and last practical example ... of the
criminal interference of the Court of Chancery").
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hesitation in saying that Lord [Parker] was wrong."177 In
America, lawyers on both sides in Stowe v. Thomas,178 the
leading American case on whether translations infringed
copyrights, distanced themselves from Parker's rationale
even as they interpreted the case to support their respective
sides.179
All these criticisms assume that what Merivale
published was an accurate report. William Odgers, late
nineteenth century Britain's preeminent commentator on
defamation, was not entirely convinced. He discounted
Burnett on the grounds that "the whole report is of very
doubtful authority, being merely a note of the case
extracted from a manuscript volume of uncertain
authorship."18 0
No one, it seems, ever had a kind word for Chancellor
Parker's purported rationale in Burnett v. Chetwood. Even
Roscoe Pound, a true friend of equity's power to enjoin libel,
acknowledged that "[o]bviously the dictum went very much
too far"181 ; he was at a loss to understand what could have
been Parker's justification for it.182
Of course, the nineteenth century's hostile response to
Parker's rationale in Burnett, even the reaction of those in
the 1810s and early 1820s who might be thought to have
some foundation in the thought-ways of the late eighteenth
century, provides only indirect evidence of the Framing
generation's views. But, when coupled with the fact that
Chancellor Parker's singular dictum was unknown to the
Constitution's Framers and ratifiers, a persuasive
177. The Emperor of Austria v. Day, (1861) 45 Eng. Rep. 861, 870 (Ch.
App.); see also 10 CAMPBELL, supra note 162, at 259 (referring to Burnett and
saying "I do not rely upon it as an authority, for the ratio dedenci cannot be
supported").
178. 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514).
179. See id. at 204-06; see also infra note 314 (discussing the disparaging
comments by an unknown editor of Alonzo Paige's New York Chancery
Reports).
180. ODGERS 1st ed., supra note 98, at 14. Even published reports before the
end of the eighteenth century were frequently inaccurate. See JOHN WALLACE,
THE REPORTERS 6-36 (4th ed. 1882) (discussing the causes of imperfect reports);
Van Vechten Veeder, The English Reports, 1292-1865, 15 HARv. L. REV. 1, 2
(1901).
181. Pound, supra note 17, at 645.
182. Id. (noting that "the old royal censorship, to which the chancellor might
claim to have succeeded, had ceased in Tudor times").
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argument emerges for setting aside Burnett v. Chetwood
when considering whether, in the late eighteenth century,
equity was thought to have any power to enjoin libel.
Because Parker's dictum was unknown, it should not be
considered in determining the state of authority at the time
of the Founding. Because it was so thoroughly criticized
when it was belatedly discovered, it is hard to conceive that
it reflected a viewpoint that had even a modest following in
the late eighteenth century.
Pound claimed that Parker's dictum "goes to show that
when Lord Eldon foreclosed the matter by his offhand
remarks in 1818 it was by no means settled by
authority."'1 3 That claim reflects a surprisingly "mechanical
jurisprudence," something which Pound generally
opposed. 84 Even if Parker's opinion in Burnett is not
spurious, 185 it most likely suggests only that in the first
quarter of the eighteenth century some members of the
English elite were nostalgic for the recent past when book
licensing was permitted. It is too much to suggest that
Parker's putative view much survived his departure from
the woolsack in 1725.186 This is especially likely given that
the next case we will review, which was decided twenty
years after Burnett, suggests a doctrine just the opposite
from Parker's putative notion that equity "had a
183. Id. Pound shows no awareness of Burnett's delayed discovery, id., and
does not discuss how an unpublished and unknown case can create a conflict of
authority. Id.
184. See Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605
(1908) (critiquing courts for their formal juriprudence and preferring a more
sociological approach).
185. See ODGERS 1st ed., supra note 98, at 14 (questioning the report's
authenticity).
186. An interesting contrast between the beginning and end of the
eighteenth century is formed by contrasting Chancellors Parker and Erskine.
The contrast overstates the change, perhaps, because Parker and Erskine
represent the extremes of elite opinion in their day. But the fact is that Parker
rose to prominence for, and was appointed Chief Justice because of, his role in
prosecuting the controversial impeachment of Henry Sacheverell for preaching
seditious sermons. See 6 CAMPBELL, supra note 162, at 15-16; 10 HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 47, at 43-44. In contrast, Chancellor Thomas Erskine, who served at
the turn of the nineteenth century, labored all his life to reform the law of libel,
believing that constitutional norms required full jury participation in
sanctioning speech. See infra text accompanying notes 188-91 (discussing
Erskine).
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superintendency over all books. ' 18 7
Consider also as evidence of the direction of dominant
opinion that from 1766-1770 the Chancellorship was held
by Charles Pratt (Lord Camden) and from 1806-1807 by
Thomas Erskine. 88  Both these men were life-long
proponents of reforming seditious libel law to empower
juries to bring in general verdicts.189  They were
instrumental in the passage of Fox's Libel Act in 1792.190 In
general, they were constant advocates of the importance of
juries as guardians against governmental abuse of speech
and press freedoms. As Chancellors, they would be unlikely
to believe that Chancery had succeeded to the Star
Chamber's censorial powers. 191
3. Roach v. Garvan. Until the late seventeenth
century, contempt of court was punished by summary
process if the contempt was committed in the judge's
presence or by an officer of the court.192 If the contempt
were committed out of court by someone who was not a
court officer, it was punished through the ordinary criminal
process. 193 One of the salient differences between summary
187. Burnett v. Chetwood, (1720) 35 Eng. Rep. 1008, 1009 (Ch.). See 10
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 47, at 672-73, 675-76, 680-84, 687-88, 690-92, 694
(discussing Camden and Erskine); 13 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 422, 585 (A.L. Goodhard & H.G. Hanbury eds., 1966) (discussing
Erskine); LEVY, supra note 48, at 282-83, 285-89 (discussing Erskine); ANON.,
supra note 134, at 290-93 (discussing Camden and Erskine).
188. For remarks in this paragraph, see 10 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 47, at
672-73, 675-76, 680-84, 687-88, 690-92, 694 (discussing Camden and Erskine);
13 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 187, at 585 (discussing Erskine); LEVY, supra note
48, at 282-83, 285-89 (discussing Erskine).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 62-89 (discussing the controversy
over the jury's role in seditious libel prosecutions).
190. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84 (discussing Fox's Libel Act).
191. See also Ex parte Jones, (1806) 33 Eng. Rep. 283 (Ch.) (acknowledging
that precedent allows summary proceedings to punish contempt by publication,
but construing precedent narrowly to cast aspersions on summary proceedings
for constructive contempts). Contempt by publication is discussed infra text
accompanying notes 192-99.
192. For the comments in this paragraph, see 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36,
at *283-88; Fox, supra note 105, at 2, 4, 108, 112-17; STEWART RAPAL.IE, A
TREATISE ON CONTEMPT 1-2, 18-19, 37-44, 70-72 (1884); Nelles & King, supra
note 110, at 401, 407-08. Blackstone states that summary punishment for out of
court contempts was an ancient practice but J. Fox, supra, corrects him.
193. RAPALJE, supra note 192, at 26-27, 150.
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and ordinary criminal processes was that trial by jury was
not allowed in summary process. 194
In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries,
English courts extended their power of summary
punishment to include some out of court contempts. 195 The
most common instance of this involved articles, letters, or
commentaries in newspapers about pending or on-going
litigation, what has come to be called "contempt by
publication."'196 Roach v. Garvan197 was the first case in
which a Chancellor summarily punished an out of court
contempt. 198 That the case involved contempt by publication
only increased the case's importance and notoriety. 99
As the seminal case on equity's power to summarily
punish contempt by publication, Roach v. Garvan was well
known in both England20 0 and America. 201 The case is
194. Nelles & King, supra note 110, at 138 (pointing to the "guarant[ee] ...
of trial by jury" as one of the main objections to "summary punishment" for
contempt by publication).
195. See Fox, supra note 105, at 2, 4, 108, 112-17; RAPALJE, supra note 192,
at 70-72; Nelles & King, supra note 110, at 407-08.
196. RAPALJE, supra note 192, at 70-72.
197. (1742) 26 Eng. Rep. 683 (Ch.), (1742) 21 Eng. Rep. 480 (Ch.). Some of
the material in the following notes cite Roach by its alternative names. See
supra note 125 and accompanying text.
198. Fox, supra note 105, at 101-06, 116-17. Roach was cited for its holding
on the contempt power, not for the language quoted below, that equity had "no
cognizance" of libels. Infra text accompanying note 208. My argument is that
anyone reading Roach would also be familiar with Hardwicke's comments on
equity and libel.
199. Roach also established that a publisher's denial of knowledge that the
material he published was libelous is not a defense to a claim of libel. See, e.g.,
Ex parte Jones, (1806) 33 Eng. Rep. 283, 284 (Ch.) (relying on Roach for the
doctrine). Additionally it is known for establishing, as part of the law of
innuendo, that using initials will not avoid liability for libel. See, e.g., JOHN C.
H. FLOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW CONCERNING LIBEL AND SLANDER 48 (1880);
MARTIN L. NEWELL, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION, LIBEL AND SLANDER IN CVIL AND
CRIMINAL CASES 262 (1st ed. 1890) (same); ODGERS 2d ed., supra note 90, at 131.
Roach was also a leading precedent for using equity commissioners and
translators to take evidence from overseas non-English speaking foreign
nationals.
200. See, e.g., Littler v. Thomson, (1839) 48 Eng. Rep. 1129 (Ch.) (counsel
citing Roach in his argument on the contempt power); Ex parte Jones, (1806) 33
Eng. Rep. 283, 283-84 (Ch.) (relying on Roach for Chancery's contempt by
publication power); FRANCIS HOLT, THE LAW OF LIBEL 157 n.(b) (1816)
(discussion of Roach).
201. See infra text accompanying notes 203-04 (discussing contempt by
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contained in John Atkyns's second volume of reports, which
was published between 1765 and 1768.202 It was cited,
along with Blackstone's Commentaries, as the foundation
for the prosecuting counsel's argument in the seminal
American case on contempt by publication, Respublica v.
Oswald,20 3 decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
1788. The same counsel relied on Roach again in 1801, in
his similarly successful argument in Hollingsworth v.
Duane,204 the first federal contempt by publication case.
Roach grew from a long-running family controversy
over guardianship, education, and marriage of well-to-do
wards under Chancery's protection. 205 During the litigation,
several newspapers published letters libeling the parties on
one side as well as some of their witnesses. 206 Chancellor
Hardwicke summarily held the newspaper publishers in
contempt for "prejudicing mankind against persons before
the cause is heard."207 During the contempt hearing, Lord
Hardwicke made clear that the publishers' punishment was
not for their libel. "[T]o be sure," he said,
Mr. Solicitor General has put [the case] upon the right footing,
publication in America).
202. See Harvard University HOLLIS Catalogue entry for John Tracy
Atkyns, Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the High Court of Chancery
(1765-68), available at http://hollis.harvard.edu (HOLLIS # 003782970). Roach
is also reported in a volume authored by John Dickens. See (1742) 21 Eng. Rep.
480 (Ch.). Dickens's report, which was posthumously published in 1803, does
not concern us because it is not the source of the language quoted infra text
accompanying note 208. See SoULE, supra note 159, at 75, n.76.
203. 1 U.S. 319, 321 (Pa. 1788). See also LEVY, supra note 48, at 206-13
(discussing Oswald); Nelles & King, supra note 110, at 410-11 (discussing
Oswald and Roach).
204. 12 F. Cas. 359, 360-62 (C.C.Pa. 1801) (No. 6616). See also Nelles &
King, supra note 110, at 412-13 (discussing Hollingsworth).
205. See Roach v. Garvan, (1748) 26 Eng. Rep. 954-56 (Ch.); Roach v.
Garvan (1748) 21 Eng. Rep. 201 (Ch.); Roach v. Garvan (1748) 28 Eng. Rep. 464(Ch.).
206. Roach, 26 Eng. Rep. at 684. The witnesses included Governors
Mackray and Pitt and the newspapers accused them of "turn[ing] affidavit
men." Id. at 683-84. An "affidavit man" is someone who will swear to something
"without regarding whether they have any conusance of the facts," frequently
for a fee. Id. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 105, at 102; Jack Greenberg, War Stories:
Reflections on Thirty-Five Years with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, 38 ST.
LouIs U. L.J. 587, 589 (1994).
207. Roach, 26 Eng. Rep. at 685. Chancellor Hardwicke was particularly
peeved that the publishers would not disclose the identity of the letters'
authors. Id. (discussing why mitigation was not appropriate).
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that notwithstanding this should be a libel, yet, unless it is a
contempt of the court, I have no cognizance of it: For whether it
is a libel against the publick or private persons, the only method
is to proceed at law. 20 8
This declaration is the first statement of what became
equity's undoubted rule. Not the exact words, but the
sentiment passed from Hardwicke to Chancellors Erskine20 9
and Eldon 210 and on to other judges and commentators. 211
In looking back over the development of the law, it was
William Odgers's view that "as long ago as 1742, it was
clearly laid down in Roach v. Garvan... that Courts of
Equity had no jurisdiction over actions of libel and slander,
whether public or private, except as contempts of their own
Courts."2
12
Some commentators did not read Roach so broadly.213
Roscoe Pound was one of them. Observing that Roach v.
Garvan was a case about imprisonment for contempt of
court, Pound read Hardwicke's remark as a comment about
208. Id. at 683.
209. Ex parte Jones, (1806) 33 Eng. Rep. 283, 284 (Ch.) (in a contempt
proceeding, saying "[b]ut, without considering, whether this is, or is not, a libel.
.. the book . . . by defaming the proceedings of the Court [seeks] to procure a
different species of judgment . . . [and] taint the source of justice"); Ex Parte
Jones, (1806) 34 Eng. Rep. 1121, 1121 (Ch.) ("[lit was agreed, that a court of
equity has no cognisance of a libellous publication, unless it amounts to a
contempt of the court.").
210. See Gee v. Pritchard, (1818) 36 Eng. Rep. 670, 674, 678 (Ch.); Southey
v. Sherwood, (1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1007 (Ch.); Pound, supra note 17, at 644
("Eldon's language (as distinguished from his action) was influenced by ... Lord
Hardwicke in Huggonson's Case."). Huggonson's Case is an alternate name for
Roach v. Garvan. See supra note 125.
211. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 212, 276-78, 293-95 (discussing
William Odgers and other commentators).
212. ODGERS 2d ed., supra note 90, at 351. See also ODGERS 1st ed., supra
note 98, at 130 (naming the case by one of its alternate names, Roach v. Read);
Meyerson, supra note 11, at 310.
213. Roscoe Pound was the first commentator to explicitly read Roach
narrowly. Some nineteenth century commentators wrote treatises on
defamation without citing Roach for the no injunction for libel rule. In order to
err on the side of circumspection, I will consider these authors as implicitly
having read the case narrowly. See, e.g., TOWNSHEND 2d ed., supra note 106, at
91-92 n.1, 168-69 n. 2 (discussing the no-injunction rule without citing Roach
though he knows the case because he relies on it in discussing innuendo by
initials (calling Roach by one of its alternate names)).
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equity's power of subsequent punishment.214 Hardwicke, in
Pound's view, "meant that he could not punish the
publication as a libel, but only as a contempt. Nothing else
was before the court, and the punishment of libels as libels
belongs to the criminal law."215
In light of Odgers's and Pound's divergent views, it is
evident that Hardwicke's remark in Roach is ambiguous.
His comment that for "libel... the only method is to proceed
at law" might have meant that equity had no jurisdiction at
all over the tort or crime of libel. 21 6 Alternatively, it might
have meant only that "the punishment of libels as libels
belongs to the criminal law."21 7
There is, in short, a broad and a narrow reading of
Hardwicke's remark. Without further evidence,
Hardwicke's authorial intent is undeterminable. We can,
however, conclude with some certainty that the late
eighteenth century's politico-legal culture would read his
dicta as reflecting the broad understanding. 218
The broad reading of Hardwicke's "no cognizance"
remark reflects equity's practice with regard to libel. 21 9 It
reflects the behavior of plaintiffs in that throughout the
eighteenth century there is not a single case in which a
libelee asked equity to restrain publication of libelous
remarks. It also accords with the notion that equity
generally did not involve itself by way of injunction or any
other way with crime or tort.220
Moreover, a "no injunction for defamation" rule would
seem to accord with eighteenth century views on the
strengths and weaknesses of equity procedure. On the one
hand, equity's "quasi-inquisitorial"221 trial process was
214. Pound, supra note 17, at 644-45.
215. Pound, supra note 17, at 644.
216. Roach v. Garvan, (1748) 26 Eng. Rep. 683, 683 (Ch.) (quoted supra text
accompanying note 208).
217. Pound, supra note 17, at 644.
218. The reasons are explored infra text accompanying notes 219-43.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 111-13 (discussing the absence of
cases).
220. See Pound, supra note 17, at 643.
221. Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due
Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. 1181, 1198 (2005).
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widely regarded as incapable of efficiently and accurately
making the factual determinations required in defamation
cases. On the other hand, equity's trial process was also
seen as inappropriate for speech and press controversies
because a jury did not have a determinative say in a case's
outcome.
In the law courts, evidence was taken, whenever
possible, by oral testimony in open court where witnesses
were subject to cross-examination and their demeanor was
observable by the trier of fact.222 In equity, evidence was
taken "secretly, and in writing,"223 by written answers to
written interrogatories. 224 Opportunities for effective cross-
examination were minimal, not only because evidence was
not given viva voce, but also because no evidence was taken
after the answers were unsealed except by special order of
the court. 225 Cross-examination, which was praised at law
as a central technique for eliciting truth, in equity was
considered "useless if not dangerous" and was "seldom
resorted to."2 26
In the main, eighteenth century equity procedure was
"protracted,"227 "inconceivably dilatory, '228 and "not adapted
to elicit the truth. ' 229 Equity procedure worked well for
cases based on documentary evidence, 230 and perhaps was
preferable to common law procedure when there were
222. See, e.g., JOHN ADAMS, THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITY 365-66 (lst ed. 1850)
[hereinafter ADAMS 1st ed]; RICHARD GRESLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS OF EQUITY 2 (1837).
223. 3 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 227 (1853).
224. See ADAMS 1st ed., supra note 222, at 366-71; WILLIAM FLETCHER, A
TREATISE ON EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE 674-77 (1902); 9 WILLIAM
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 354-55 (1966).
225. ADAMS 1st ed., supra note 222, at 371; 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 224,
at 356; HENRY MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 29 (2d ed.
1948).
226. 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 224, at 355.
227. 3 GREENLEAF, supra note 223, at 228. See also ADAMS 1st ed., supra
note 222, at 367 (same); FLETCHER, supra note 224, at 676 (same).
228. 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 224, at 360 (speaking, in particular, of cases
requiring masters).
229. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 225, at 29. See also 3 GREENLEAF, supra note
223, at 228 (stating equity procedure "furnishes the temptation to . . .false
testimony... [and] afford[s] facilities to perjury").
230. See GRESLEY, supra note 222, at 2-3.
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"numerous parties and intermingled issues,"231 or where the
proceedings required preservation of evidence. 232 Yet,
Holdsworth captured the professional consensus when he
wrote: "It may safely be said that a more futile method of
getting at the facts of a case, than the system in use in the
court of Chancery from the seventeenth century onwards,
never existed in any mature legal system. 233
In recognition of "the unsatisfactory method of taking
evidence in equity, ' 234 Chancellors developed, by the
eighteenth century, a process of referring cases to law to get
the facts settled by a jury trial.235 Still, in these cases, the
jury's verdict was "advisory" 236 and the "Chancellor [was]...
at liberty.., to treat it as a mere nullity, and to decide
against it .... ,,237
The Chancellor's right to disregard a jury verdict, if one
were even asked for, raises the second procedural concern
that would support a broad reading of Hardwicke's "no
cognizance" remark in Roach v. Garvan. As Jean Louis De
Lolme pointed out in his analysis of free speech principles,
free speech depended not only on the rule against prior
restraints but also on trial by jury.238 Indeed, in De Lolme's
view, it was trial by jury, rather than the ban on prior
restraints, "which more particularly constitutes the freedom
231. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 225, at 29. This is an example of "complex
litigation," which is exempt from the Seventh Amendment requirement of a jury
trail. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
661-64 (6th ed. 2002).
232. ADAMS 1st ed., supra note 222, at 366; FLETCHER, supra note 224, at
673-74.
233. 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 224, at 353. See also id. at 371-76
(comparing the strengths and weaknesses of common law and equity procedure
and concluding the "advantage rests with the common law procedure");
MCCLINTOCK, supra note 225, at 29 ("[]t is manifest that the [equity] procedure
was not adapted to elicit the truth where there was conflict in the testimony of
the witnesses.").
234. POUND, supra note 17, at 644.
235. See ADAMS 1st ed., supra note 222, at 366; FLETCHER, supra note 224, §
657 at 673; 3 GREENLEAF, supra note 223, at 236; MCCLINTOCK, supra note 225,
at 29.
236. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE
COMMON LAw 259 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1898).
237. 3 GREENLEAF, supra note 223, at 237. See also ADAMS 1st ed., supra
note 222, at 377; MCCLINTOCK, supra note 225, at 29.
238. DE LOLME, supra note 93, at 213.
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of the press. ' 23 9 Judges needed the check of a jury because,
like all magistrates, they were prone to partiality with
regard to any publication that "highly excites the jealously
of the governing powers. '240 For that reason, De Lolme
emphasized that for the press to be free, juries must stand
between the defendant and the judge and have a decisive
role in the adjudication of speech controversies.
Finally, whatever mistrust there might be in leaving
speech and press decisions entirely to a judge would be
amplified with regard to a Chancellor. In the eighteenth
century, judges of the common law courts had achieved a
measure of independence because the 1701 Act of
Settlement mandated that judges serve "during good
behavior. ' 241  This provision did not encompass the
Chancellor. Despite his judicial role, the Chancellor
remained an important political figure who served at the
King's discretion. 242
In sum, in the eighteenth century, there was a growing,
and by the century's end, dominant aversion to entrusting
speech and press controversies entirely to judges operating
without the constraint of a jury. In the eighteenth century,
for political as well as procedural reasons, the factual
determinations required in libel controversies were
considered "adapted peculiarly to trial by jury. '243
The Founding generation's expectation with regard to
whether equity had jurisdiction to enjoin defamation is a
question of historical judgment. Eighteenth century
assumptions about the requirements for speech and press
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Act of Settlement, 1701, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2 (Eng.) ("[q]uam diu se bene
gesserint"). England's establishment of an independent judiciary did not extend
to America where colonial judges continued to serve "at the King's pleasure"
and judicial decisions were subject to review by the Privy Council whose
members also did not have good-behavior tenure. See Peter M. Shane,
Interbranch Accountability in State Government and the Constitutional
Requirement of Judicial Independence, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 21, 27
(1998).
242. See Anon., supra note 134, at 307-11 (describing the Chancellor as a
"member" of the government and comparing his role in adjudicating libel
unfavorably to the jury).
243. Pound, supra note 17, at 644. See also 10 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 187,
at 680-88 (discussing Camden and Erskine); LEVY, supra note 48, at 282-83, 285
(discussing Erskine).
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freedoms, as well as the casual and quick development of
the rule after the turn of the century, strongly support the
inference that late-eighteenth century politico-legal culture
believed equity lacked power to enjoin defamation. This
would be especially true in America where equity was even
more identified with arbitrary Crown power than in
England. 244 In this context, Hardwicke's declaration that
equity takes "no cognizance" of libel would likely be read to
encompass preventive orders as well as subsequent
punishment.
If there is any lack of certainty, it is only because, as
Roscoe Pound maintained, the facts of Roach v. Garvan,245
which involve subsequent punishment for contempt of
court, prevent us from insisting that the question of
preventive orders had been "settled by authority. '246 My
argument in the next section is that even that lacuna was
cleared up over the next three-quarters of a century. By the
1860s, when the Fourteenth Amendment was proposed and
adopted, the answer was perfectly clear: the no injunction
for defamation rule was undoubtedly established as an
aspect of speech and press freedoms.
II. INJUNCTIONS FOR DEFAMATION IN
THE RECONSTRUCTION ERA
A. Context-Other Sanctions for Defamation.
1. Criminal Liability. Established by English and
colonial practice, criminal liability for defamation continued
throughout the nineteenth century.247 For a while, even
prosecutions for seditious libel continued, most famously
244. See, e.g., Stanley N. Katz, The Politics of Law in Colonial America:
Controversies over Chancery Courts and Equity Law in the Eighteenth Century,
in LAw IN AMERICAN HISTORY 257, 257-58 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn
eds., Little, Brown & Co. 1971).
245. (1742) 26 Eng. Rep. 683 (Ch.).
246. Pound, supra note 17, at 645.
247. See, e.g., In re Banks, 42 P. 693 (Kan. 1895); Commonwealth v.
Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304 (1825); State v. Van Wye, 37 S.W. 938 (Mo.
1896); Respublica v. Dennie, 4 Yeates 267 (Pa. 1805); State v. Lehre, 6 S.C.L. (1
Tread.) 809 (1811). Criminal libel prosecutions persisted as late as the mid-
twentieth century. See Kelly, supra note 85, at 434 n.21 (counting criminal libel
prosecutions in the Decennial Digests).
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under the federal Sedition Act of 1798.248 In his 1833
treatise on constitutional law, Joseph Story gave a vigorous
defense of the doctrine, at least when prosecutions were
brought by state governments. 249 Other commentators
argued that criminal prosecutions for criticizing the
government or system of government were
unconstitutional. 250 Eventually criminal prosecutions for
seditious libel became obsolete.251 Nevertheless, criminal
prosecutions for libeling public officials persisted, as did
prosecutions for libels of private citizens. 252 Some modern
commentators doubt that criminal libel prosecutions would
be permissible in twenty-first century America. 253 Still,
there was no doubt of their constitutionality at the time the
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.
Criminal libel was an accepted part of nineteenth
century law, but it survived subject to the reforms
introduced by Fox's Libel Act in England and adopted by
248. Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (titled "An act for the
punishment of certain crimes against the United States"). See also Henry P.
Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 529 n.45
(1970) (discussing extensive enforcement of Fox's Libel Act in England during
the Napoleonic wars). See generally JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS:
THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 159-418 (1956)
(reviewing the Sedition Act's enforcement).
249. 3 STORY, supra note 96, at 732-33, 738-43. Story "abstain[ed] from
expressing any opinion" of the national government's power to criminalize
seditious libel. Id. at 743.
250. See, e.g., COOLEY, supra note 96, at 429; LEVY, supra note 48, at 325-27
(discussing St. George Tucker).
251. See COOLEY, supra note 96, at 429; ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER
509 (1904).
252. See State v. Boogher, 3 Mo. App. 442 (1877); State v. Burnham, 9 N.H.
34 (1837); FREUND, supra note 251, at 506; CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A
TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED STATES (St. Louis,
F.H. Thomas Law Book Co. 1886). Public officials also were protected, like any
other citizens, by their ability to bring a civil action. See Root v. King, 7 Cow.
613 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827); COOLEY, supra note 96, at 435-39; Kelly, supra note
85, at 439-40. State courts did not begin imposing more stringent requirements
on suits by public officials until the late nineteenth century. See Kelly, supra
note 85, at 440-42.
253. See Kelly, supra note 85, at 434 n.21 (discussing Thomas Emerson and
John Kelly); Clive Walker, Reforming the Crime of Libel, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
169, 196-200 (2005-06); Note, Constitutionality of the Law of Criminal Libel, 52
COLUM. L. REV. 521 (1952). See also Leflar, supra note 50 (finding no utility in
criminalizing defamation).
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the national government in the Sedition Act of 1798.254 By
state constitutional provision, statute, or judicial decision,
it became the near universal rule in early America that
truth was a defense to criminal prosecution when the
remarks were published for 'good motives and justifiable
ends.' 255 So too, states generally adopted the reform that
juries had power to bring in a general verdict and to
determine the law and facts of the case.25 6
In other words, in 1790 the law of criminal libel was in
flux. The reform of free speech protections, which focused
on augmenting the role of the jury, was not clearly part of
constitutional law at the Founding. Nonetheless, the jury's
enlarged role was part of the Reconstruction Era's
understanding of the Anglo-American system of free speech.
As Ernst Freund concluded in his 1904 treatise on the
Police Power: "It... appears that freedom of political
discussion and criticism was sought to be secured, not by
altering the substantive law of libel, but by providing for a
popular control of its administration.) 257
2. Civil Liability. Civil liability for defamation
continued along the lines established by the pre-
Revolutionary common law. Truth continued as a "complete
defen[s]e." 258 So too did popular control, which had been
established by the requirement of a jury verdict before civil
liability could be imposed on defamation defendants. 259
In maintaining the tradition of not imposing liability on
254. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84 and 86 (discussing Fox's Libel
Act and the Sedition Act).
255. COOLEY, supra note 96, at 464. See also id. at 463-65 (discussing truth
as a defense and the role of the jury); FREUND, supra note 251, at 506-07; 2
KENT, supra note 85, at 15-22; 3 STORY, supra note 96, at 733, 742; Kelly, supra
note 85, at 431-33.
256. See COOLEY, supra note 96, at 462-63; FREUND, supra note 251, at 507.
In some states the jury had independent power to determine the law. In other
states, the jury had only the unreviewable power to apply the law as stated by
the judge. See, e.g., COOLEY, supra at 462-63.
257. FREUND, supra note 251, at 508. Nevertheless, in its last
pronouncement on the subject, the Supreme Court upheld a statute allowing
the trial judge, not the jury, to determine whether an utterance was libelous.
See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254 (1952).
258. COOLEY, supra note 96, at 464. See also supra text accompanying note
38.
259. See supra text accompanying notes 41-46; see also infra text
accompanying notes 260-67.
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defamation defendants without a jury verdict, nineteenth
century judges resisted extending to defamation the new
understanding of judge-jury relations that they were
imposing on most other areas of the civil justice system. In
the nineteenth century, judges asserted more control over
juries through development of such tools as directed
verdicts and judgments N.O.V.260 This development, which
represented erosion of popular control over civil justice, was
a slow and piecemeal development that is difficult to trace
out fully. Suffice it to say that even if judicial control over
civil verdicts was sufficiently established by the
Reconstruction Era to make directed verdicts and
judgments N.O.V. aspects of due process for Fourteenth
Amendment purposes in most civil actions, it does not
follow that defamation suits were part of this development.
In fact, by the Reconstruction period, and even by the end of
the century, the newly enlarged jury control devices had not
been extended to impose verdicts on defendants in libel
cases. 261 Indeed, it is likely that up to the present day no
court has ever concluded a case by granting a defamation
260. See Blume, supra note 41, at 562-75 (discussing development of
directed verdicts in state and federal trials); Frank Warren Hackett, Has a
Trial Judge of the United States Court the Right to Direct a Verdict, 24 YALE
L.J. 127, 127-29, 134-44 (1914); Stephan Landsman, Appellate Courts and Civil
Juries, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 873, 890-92 (2002) (discussing development of directed
verdicts and judgments N.O.V. in federal trials); Schnapper, supra note 43, at
239; Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury
Reform, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 443-45, 489-91 (1996) (discussing directed
verdicts and judgments N.O.V.); Ellen E. Sward, The Seventh Amendment and
the Alchemy of Fact and Law, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 573, 592-624, 629-32
(2003) (discussing development of directed verdicts and judgments N.O.V.);
Note, Changing Role, supra note 45, at 183-85 (discussing development of
directed verdict in Massachusetts).
I do not consider summary judgments as they were not generally authorized
in civil trials until the 1870s in England, and the 1930s in America. See John A.
Bauman, The Evolution of the Summary Judgment Procedure: An Essay
Commemorating the Centennial Anniversary of Keating's Act, 31 IND. L.J. 329,
339-40, 343-45 (1956); Charles E. Clark & Charles U. Samenow, The Summary
Judgment, 38 YALE L.J. 423, 424, 440 (1929).
261. See Lupkey v. Weldon, 419 S.W.2d 91, 93 (Mo. 1967) (discussing late
nineteenth and early twentieth century precedent). See also infra text
accompanying notes 266-67 (discussing principle that libel liability required
both judicial and jury approval). In an extended look at the nineteenth century
Decennial Digests and an exhaustive look at nineteenth century treatises on
defamation I have failed to find a single case in which a defamation plaintiff
prevailed on a motion for directed verdict or judgment N.O.V.
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plaintiffs motion for directed verdict or judgment N.O.V. 2 62
Significantly, with regard to taking defamation cases
away from the jury, nineteenth century judges treated
defamation plaintiffs and defendants quite differently. In
marked contrast to their refusal to impose liability on
defamation defendants without a jury verdict, nineteenth
century judges frequently granted involuntarily non-suits
or directed verdicts against defamation plaintiffs. 263 The
most a nineteenth century judge might do when he thought
the evidence clearly supported a defamation plaintiff was
grant a new trial after the jury had (incorrectly, in the
judge's view) ruled in favor of the defendant. 264 Moreover, in
some states the grounds for awarding new trials to
defamation plaintiffs were subject to uniquely stringent
criteria, such as evidence of jury corruption.265
262. Modern treatises on defamation law fail to mention any case and
emphasize the role of these devices in protecting defendants. See, e.g., ROBERT
D. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 557-59 (1980); 2 SMOLLA,
supra note 5, §§ 12:78-12:82. See also Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666, 679
(3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the trial court directed a verdict of liability against
defamation defendant, leaving only assessment of damages to jury, was among
several reasons for reversal); Lupkey, 419 S.W.2d at 93 (discussing Missouri's
continuing refusal to direct verdicts against defamation defendants). These
comments also apply to motions for summary judgment. See, e.g., SACK, supra
at 535-56; 2 SMOLLA, supra at §§ 12:69-12:77.
Dean Rodney Smolla suggests several reasons for the absence of successful
motions for directed verdict or judgments N.O.V. by defamation plaintiffs.
Among them are the complexity of modern defamation law, the high doctrinal
burden plaintiffs confront, and, most important to this paper's thesis, the
cultural ethos dating to the Zenger case that defendants have a right to a jury
trial. The possibility of jury nullification "stands as a bulwark against
censorship." Email from Rodney A. Smolla, Dean, Washington & Lee School of
Law, to Stephen A. Siegel (n.d.) (on file with author).
263. See, e.g., Hazy v. Woitke, 48 P. 1048, 1049-50 (Colo. 1897) (stating
defendants may be non-suited, but not granted directed verdicts); NEWELL 1st
ed., supra note 199, at 281, 830-32.
264. See, e.g., FRANKLIN FISKE HEARD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LIBEL AND
SLANDER 351-53 (Lowell, Fisher A. Hildreth 1860). English practice was similar.
See JOSEPH R. FISHER & JAMES ANDREW STRAHAN, THE LAW OF THE PRESS 100-01
(London, William Clowes & Sons, Ltd. 1st ed. 1891) [hereinafter FISHER &
STRAHAN 1st ed.].
265. See Clark v. Hatfield, 88 Ill. 440, 441 (1878) (describing this position as
"[t]he general rule"); Rundell v. Butler, 10 Wend. 119, 120-22 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1833); JOHN TOWNSHEND, A TREATISE ON THE WRONGS CALLED SLANDER AND
LIBEL 386 (N.Y., Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1868) [hereinafter TOWNSHEND 1st ed.];
JOHN TOWNSHEND, A TREATISE ON THE WRONGS CALLED SLANDER AND LIBEL 526-
27 (4th ed. 1890) [hereinafter TOWNSHEND 4th ed.]. But see Johnson v. Scribner,
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In other words, the continuation throughout the
nineteenth century of the Revolutionary era understanding
that it was impossible for a defamation defendant to be
found liable without a jury verdict against him stands as an
exception to the general trend toward greater judicial
control of juries. In the eighteenth century, the power of the
civil defamation jury was in line with the power of civil
juries generally. By the end of the nineteenth century, it
was an exception that illustrates the unique importance of
juries in defamation litigation.
Two considerations underlay the judiciary's refusal to
extend the new jury control devices to compel verdicts
against defamation defendants. One was that defamation
actions, though civil, were sufficiently "penal" or "vindictive
in their nature" to call for importing criminal justice norms
allowing juries to function as a buffer between defendants
and state power.266 The other was the view that the free
speech reform movement, which culminated in the passage
of Fox's Libel Act in England and in similar constitutional
provisions, statutes, and judicial decisions in America,
applied broadly to both criminal and civil liability.
According to this view, the late eighteenth-century reforms
stood for the constitutional principle that in criminal or civil
actions
[T]he prosecutor or plaintiff must... satisfy a jury that the words
are such, and so published, as to convey the libelous imputation. If
the defendant can get either the court or the jury to be in his favor,
he succeeds. The prosecutor, or plaintiff, cannot succeed unless he
gets both the court and the jury to decide for him.267
6 Conn. 185, 189-90 (1826) (criticizing and rejecting the rule); Harton v. Reavis,
4 N.C. (Car. L. Rep.) 256, 256-57 (1815) (rejecting the rule but acknowledging
English precedent in support of it).
266. Paddock v. Salisbury, 2 Cow. 811, 815 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824). See also
sources cited supra note 265. Consider also cases in both American and England
holding that equity would not compel discovery in aid of libel actions at law
because of the principle that discovery was available only for actions that were
"entirely civil," which excluded "actions penal in their nature." 1 JOHN NORTON
POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 189-90 (San Francisco, A.L.
Bancroft & Co., 1st ed. 1881) (citing cases). See also GEORGE JEREMY, A
TREATISE ON THE EQUITY JURISDICTION OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY 266
(N.Y., Halsted & Voorhies, Law Booksellers, 2d Am. ed. 1840) (explaining
equity "will not compel a disclosure of circumstances which may subject the
defendant to any criminal prosecution").
267. Hazy, 48 P. at 1049 (quoting Capital & Counties Bank v. Henty, 7 L.R.
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B. Injunctions for Defamation.
In the period between the Founding and
Reconstruction, respect for the role of juries in defamation
controversies manifested itself not only in the law courts'
refusal to compel verdicts against defamation defendants,
but also in equity's continued adherence to the tradition
that it would not restrain defamation. Between 1789 and
1868, any ambiguity about the status of the no-injunction
rule was resolved. The no injunction for defamation rule
was a clearly established aspect of the Reconstruction Era's
system of free speech.
1. England. If there was any ambiguity about
England's rule on enjoining defamatory speech, it was
erased in the tide of opinions after Chancellor Eldon's
casual remark on the subject. 268 In six cases between 1818
and 1861, the English judiciary, in both the equity courts269
App. Cas. 741, 776 (H.L. 1882) (per Lord Blackburn)). See also Harrington v.
Butte Miner Co., 139 P. 451, 451-52 (Mont. 1914); Heller v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co.,
54 S.W. 457, 459 (Mo. 1899); Snyder v. Andrews, 6 Barb. 43 (N.Y. Gen. Term
1849); PAUL MITCHELL, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN LAW OF DEFAMATION 37
(2005) (discussing English and American views); ODGERS 2d ed., supra note 90,
at 362-63 (discussing English law). Thus, in some states, the principles of the
Revolutionary era free speech reforms extended beyond criminal libel
prosecutions and counseled that in civil suits,
[W]hile the court may sustain a demurrer to the plaintiffs petition, or
non-suit the plaintiff on the trial, or sustain a motion in arrest of a
judgment against the defendant, it cannot direct a verdict for the
plaintiff in a libel case. In this respect libel cases differ from other
cases.
Heller, 54 S.W. at 459. See also Ukman v. Daily Record Co., 88 S.W. 60, 64 (Mo.
1905) (stating that in libel actions "the court may direct a non-suit, but cannot
coerce a verdict for plaintiff').
In this regard, it should be noted that throughout the nineteenth century,
and into the twentieth century, England continued to provide a right to jury
trial in defamation actions even as it was abandoning that right in civil actions
generally. See MITCHELL, supra, at 56-57 (discussing juries); Pound, supra note
17, at 656-57 (noting that even though juries are rarely allowed any more in
England, defamation trials remain as one of the few exceptions).
268. See supra text accompanying note 115-20 (discussing Eldon's remark in
Gee v. Pritchard).
269. Emperor of Austria v. Day, (1861) 45 Eng. Rep. 861, 870 (Ch.) (per Ch.
Campbell); Gee v. Pritchard, (1818) 36 Eng. Rep. 670, 674 (Ch.) (per Ch. Eldon);
Clark v. Freeman, (1848) 50 Eng. Rep. 759, 762 (M.R.) (per M.R. Langdale);
Seeley v. Fisher, (1841) 59 Eng. Rep. 998, 999 (V. Ch.) (per Ch. Cottenham);
Martin v. Wright, (1833) 58 Eng. Rep. 605, 606 (V. Ch.) (per V.C. Shadwell).
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and the House of Lords, 270 repeatedly asserted that equity
could not enjoin defamation. Shortly after 1868, three more
cases asserted the same rule.271
Among the reasons given for England's course of
decision is that if equity were to enjoin libel it would "be
reviving the criminal jurisdiction of the Star Chamber. '272
In addition, as was said in a House of Lords case, it was
impossible for the
exercise of such a jurisdiction [to] be reconciled with the trial of...
libel and defamation by juries.., or indeed with the liberty of the
press.... [The liberty of the press consists in the unrestricted right
of publishing, subject to the responsibilities attached to the
publication of libels.... But if the publication is to be anticipated
and prevented by the intervention of the Court... , the jurisdiction
over libels is taken from the jury, and the right of unrestricted
publication is destroyed.27 3
These were considered "very strong reasons,"274 and the
result was that, in reaffirming the rule in 1875, Chancellor
Cairns could accurately say,
[A]s I have always understood, it is clearly settled that the Court
of Chancery has no jurisdiction to restrain [a] publication merely
because it is a libel.... [N]o case can be produced in which... the
Court of Chancery has interfered. Not merely is there no authority
for [an injunction], but the books afford repeated instances of the
refusal to exercise jurisdiction. 2 75
Drawing from these cases, numerous English treatise
270. See Fleming v. Newton, (1848) 9 Eng. Rep. 797, 803 (H.L.) (per Ch.
Cottenham).
271. See Fisher & Co. v. Apollinaris Co., (1875) L.R. 10 Ch. App. 297, 302
(per W.M. James, L.J.); Prudential Assurance Co. v. Knott, (1875) L.R. 10 Ch.
App. 142, 145 (per Ch. Cairns); Mulkern v. Ward, (1872) 13 L.R.Eq. 619, 621
(Ch.) (per V.C. Wickens).
272. Clark v. Freeman, (1848) 50 Eng. Rep. 759, 762 (M.R.) (per M.R.
Langdale). Related to this was the idea that equity had no criminal jurisdiction
and civil defamation was partially penal in nature. See Gee v. Pritchard, (1818)
36 Eng. Rep. 670, 674 (Ch.). See also supra text accompanying note 266
(discussing view that civil defamation is penal and vindictive).
273. Fleming, 9 Eng. Rep. at 803 (per Ch. Cottenham).
274. Mulkern, 13 L.R.Eq. at 621 (per V.C. Wickens).
275. Prudential Assurance Co., L.R. 10 Ch. App. at 144-45.
2008] INJUNCTIONS FOR DEFAMATION 707
writers, whether they wrote about defamation, 276
injunctions, 277 or equity jurisprudence, 278 unambiguously
stated the rule that "[t]he Court of Chancery... could not
interfere by injunction to stay the publication of a libel. And
therefore, whether it was a libel against the public, or of
any private person, the only method was to proceed at
law."2 79
These cases and treatises were well known to American
judges and lawyers. 280 To the extent that English law
influenced the expectations of the generation that adopted
the Fourteenth Amendment, and nineteenth century
English law frequently did influence American
developments, the expectation would be that equity should
not enjoin defamation. Moreover, the reasons for the no-
injunction rule would include the bar on prior restraints
and the respect for the jury's role in adjudicating free
speech controversies.
This conclusion regarding the Reconstruction
generation's understanding of English law stands despite
276. See HENRY COLEMAN FOLKARD, THE LAW OF SLANDER AND LIBEL 551
(London, Butterworths, 4th ed. 1876).
277. See EDEN 1st ed., supra note 106, at 315-18; 1 WILLIAM JOYCE, THE LAW
AND PRACTICE OF INJUNCTIONS IN EQUITY AND AT COMMON LAW 715 (Cincinnati,
Robert Clarke & Co. 1872); WILLIAM WILLIAMSON KERR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
AND PRACTICE OF INJUNCTIONS IN EQUITY 1-2 (London, William Maxwell & Son
1st ed. 1867).
278. See ADAMS 1st ed., supra note 222, at 216; JOHN SMITH, A TREATISE ON
THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 79 (1856).
279. FOLKARD 4th ed., supra note 276, at 551 (footnote omitted). See also
sources cited supra notes 276-78. Treatises from the 1880s, which draw from
developments in England in the late-1870s, state modifications of the rule. See
FLOOD, supra note 199, at 257-58 (stating that an injunction is permissible);
ODGERS 1st ed., supra note 98, at 13-16 (explaining that an injunction is
permissible after a jury verdict). See also infra text accompanying notes 281-91
(discussing the developments in England).
280. For cases discussing nineteenth-century English precedent see Singer
Mfg. Co. v. Domestic Sewing Mach. Co., 49 Ga. 70, 73-74 (1873); Boston Diatite
Co. v. Florence Mfg. Co., 114 Mass. 69, 70 (1873); Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige
Ch. 24, 26-28 (N.Y. Ch. 1839). See also Freeman, supra note 18, at 171-72
(discussing the English cases). Some of the treatises were well-known because
they were published in American editions. See, e.g., JOHN ADAMS, THE DOCTRINE
OF EQUITY 426 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson Co., 5 th Am. ed. 1868); ROBERT
HENLEY EDEN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS 372-74 (N.Y., Gould,
Banks & Co., 2d Am. ed. 1839); HENRY FOLKARD, THE LAW OF LIBEL AND
SLANDER 729-30 (New York, Banks, 1st Am. ed. 1877); KERR 1st ed., supra note
277, at 2, 507; ODGERS 1st ed., supra note 98, at 13-16.
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the fact that in 1878 England began cutting back on the
traditional no-injunction rule and abandoned it by the end
of the century.28 1 England's departure from the rule has
little significance for an understanding of Reconstruction-
era American views. First, the English departure did not
begin until a decade after the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment and, therefore, could not have had any
influence on the understanding of its Framers and ratifiers.
Second, America's protections of free speech were
unlike England's in that they were embodied in written
constitutions. The no-injunction rule rested on a stronger
foundation in America than in England. American courts
specifically pointed to their written constitutions' protection
of free speech and jury trial as the basis for their refusal to
follow England's lead.28 2 Indeed, England's late nineteenth
century departure from the no-injunction rule was the first
step in the separation of English and American defamation
law. Today, the English law of defamation is far less
protective of speakers than American law. 28 3 The English
281. See, e.g., Monson v. Tussauds, Ltd., (1894) 1 Q.B. 671, 692-94; Thorley's
Cattle Food Co. v. Massam, (1879) 14 Ch.. 781, 776-78 (Ct. App.); Saxby v.
Easterbrook & Hannaford, (1878) 3 C.P.D. 339, 342-43 (Div. Ct.); JOSEPH
FISHER & J. STRAHAN, THE LAW OF THE PRESS 228-31 (2d ed. 1898) [hereinafter
FISHER & STRAHAN 2d ed.]; W. BLAKE ODGERS, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF LIBEL
AND SLANDER 386-96 (London, Stevens & Sons, Ltd., 3d ed. 1896) [hereinafter
ODGERS 3d ed.]. Vice Chancellor Malins had begun a campaign against the rule
in 1868. See Dixon v. Holden, (1869) 7 L.R.Eq. 488 (Ch.); Springhead Spinning
Co. v. Riley, (1868) 6 L.R.Eq. 551 (Ch.). His initiative was soundly reversed by
Prudential Assurance Co. v. Knott, (1875) L.R. 10 Ch. App. 142. In any event,
Malins' efforts were unlikely to have had any influence on the expected
meaning of free speech under the Fourteenth Amendment as his efforts began
just before its ratification was complete.
282. See, e.g., Balliet v. Cassidy, 104 F. 704, 705-06 (C.C.D. Or. 1900);
Corliss v. E.W. Walker Co., 57 F. 434, 435 (C.C.D. Mass. 1893); Kidd v. Horrey,
28 F. 773, 774-76 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1886); Flint v. Hutchinson Smoke Burner Co.,
19 S.W. 804, 805-06 (Mo. 1892). See also 2 CHARLES FISK BEACH, JR.,
COMMENTARIES ON MODERN EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 850-51 (N.Y. Baker,
Voorhis, & Co. 1892) (noting that American courts are not following the recent
English decisions); 3 POMEROY, supra note 266, at 390-91 (same).
283. See MITCHELL, supra note 267, at 101-22 (tracing the rise of strict
liability in English defamation law to the late nineteenth century in response to
the rise of mass-media journalism); 1 SMOLLA, supra note 5, at § 1:9. For
example, English defamation law is today still based on strict liability while in
America there must be negligence and malice in public figure cases. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 1046, 1050, 1052-53; MITCHELL, supra, at 113-16
(comparing England and America). England also allows interim injunctions and
America does not. See infra notes 289, 418 (discussing interim injunctions).
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departure from the no-injunction rule was the initial
example of a defamation law development that American
courts did not consider appropriate for their polity.
Finally, the English departure stemmed from a new
development in English jurisprudence: the 1873 Judicature
Act's merger of law and equity into a single court that
exercised all the powers of the formerly separate
tribunals.28 4 After 1873, a court operating with a jury, a
jury whose verdict was binding and not just advisory, might
grant injunctions. 28 5 Appreciation of juries was essential to
the reasoning that justified English courts, after merger, in
issuing injunctions against defamation. The presence of a
jury in a court with power to grant injunctions provided
both a warrant and a limit to the new departure. Among
the limits was the rule that to be entitled to an injunction
the plaintiff had to "establish[ ] a complete cause of
action. ' 286 This included proof of actual damages when the
libel was not actionable per se. 28 7 In addition, the judge
could enjoin no more than what the jury had found to be
defamatory. 28 8 And, there had to be a jury verdict. 28 9
284. See Kidd v. Horry, 28 F. 773, 774-75 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1886) (discussing
English developments); ODGERS 3d ed., supra note 281, at 390 (citing Monson v.
Tussauds, Ltd., (1894) 1 Q.B. 671).
285. ODGERS 3d ed., supra note 281, at 386. In England, after 1854, there
might be a bench trial, but either the plaintiff or the defendant could demand a
jury. See FISHER & STRAHAN 1st ed., supra note 264, at 164; MITCHELL, supra
note 267, at 56-57.
286. ODGERS 3d ed., supra note 281, at 386.
287. See id. at 386-87.
288. Id. at 386.
289. I am discussing permanent injunctions. In the 1880s, English judges
began to grant interlocutory injunctions before a jury's verdict. Id. at 388, 390.
These orders, however, were interim; their permanence depended on the trial's
outcome. Id. at 388. In addition, the issuance of interim injunctions was subject
to a number of safeguards designed to "reconcile[ ]" their "availability ... with
the role of the jury." MITCHELL, supra note 267, at 92. For example,
interlocutory injunctions were inappropriate "[ulnless the words [were] so
clearly libellous, that if a jury found them not to be libellous, the Court of
Appeal would set the verdict aside as unreasonable." ODGERS 3d ed., supra note
281, at 389. See also FISHER & STRAHAN 2d ed., supra note 281, at 228-31
(discussing safeguards on interim injunctions); MITCHELL, supra note 267, at
91-93 (same); ODGERS 3d ed., supra, at 388-94 (same); TOWNSHEND 4th ed.
supra note 265, at 693 (discussing an English case allowing an injunction "until
the trial of the action [for libel]"). Under modern American law, interim
injunctions would seem to be an impermissible prior restraint absent the most
compelling reasons. In defamation cases, this standard is unlikely to be met.
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Nineteenth century English judges might grant new trials
but they could not compel verdicts for defamation
plaintiffs. 290 England, in fact, was the source of the
comment, quoted by nineteenth century American courts,
that for defamation plaintiffs to prevail they had to satisfy
both a judge and a jury.291
2. America.
a. Before 1868. Before the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, the rule that equity did
not enjoin defamation appeared not only in English cases
and treatises that were well known in America, 292 it also
appeared in leading American treatises on libel, 293
injunctions, 294 and equity jurisprudence. 295 No publication
See infra note 418 (discussing interim injunctions in America).
290. See FISHER & STRAHAN ist ed., supra note 264, at 100-01; ODGERS 3d
ed., supra note 281, at 389; TOWNSHEND 4th ed., supra note 265, at 689.
291. See supra text accompanying note 267 (citing American cases). For the
English case see Capital & Counties Bank v. Henty, (1882) 7 App. Cas. 741, 776
(H.L.) (per Lord Blackburn). See also 10 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 47, 691-92
(tracing the establishment of the tradition, in both criminal and civil trials, of
providing defamation defendants with a double protection to Fox's Libel Act).
292. See, e.g., FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS 398 (1st ed. 1865)
(citing an English case); TOWNSHEND 1st ed., supra note 265, at 46 n.26
(discussing English cases); supra note 280 (citing English treatises with
American editions). Gee v. Pritchard, (1818) 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (Ch.), was a
particularly noted case. Besides grounding the no-injunction rule, see supra text
accompanying notes 114-20, it famously suggested that letters are the literary
property of the writer, and contained Eldon's reiteration of Selden's famous
"reproach that the equity of this Court varies like the Chancellor's foot." Gee, 36
Eng. Rep. at 674. For examples of pre-1868 cites to Gee, see Bartlett v.
Crittenden, 2 F. Cas. 967, 970 (C.C.D. Ohio 1849) (No. 1076); Pierpont v. Fowle,
19 F. Cas. 652, 658 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846) (No. 11,152); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas.
342, 346 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901); Gresham v. Webb, 29 Ga. 320, 321
(1859); Grigsby v. Breckenridge, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480, 487, 505 (1867) (in
majority and dissenting opinion); Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige Ch. 24, 27-28
(N.Y. Ch. 1839); N.Y. Printing & Dying Establishment v. Fitch, 1 Paige Ch. 97,
98 (N.Y. Ch. 1828) (per counsel); Eyre v. Higbee, 35 Barb. 502, 504 (N.Y. Gen.
Term 1861); JOHN ADAMS, THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITY 410, 414 (2d Am. ed. 1852);
2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 263 n. 1 (Boston,
Charles C. Little & James Brown, 3d ed. 1843).
293. See STARKIE, supra note 143; TOWNSHEND Ist ed., supra note 265, at 46.
Starkie's treatise went through multiple American editions before 1868.
294. See EDEN 2d Am. ed., supra note 280, at 372-74; HILLIARD 1st ed., supra
note 292, at 398. Eden's treatise went through multiple American editions
before 1868.
295. See ADAMS 2d Am. ed., supra note 292, at 413; JAMES P. HOLCOMBE, AN
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stated any other rule.296
In addition, the no-injunction rule was forcefully stated
in the only reported American case addressing whether
equity could enjoin defamatory remarks. That case,
Brandreth v. Lance,297 was decided in 1839 by New York's
well-respected Chancellor Walworth. In the nineteenth
century, Brandreth was regarded as a leading case. It was
widely cited as authoritative in the pre-Reconstruction
treatise literature298 as well as in post-Reconstruction
treatises and cases.299 Among the many reasons for its
stature300 is that in Brandreth Chancellor Walworth gave a
resounding affirmation of the no-injunction rule premised
on "the liberty of the press" and "principles of a free
government."30
INTRODUCTION TO EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 168 (Cincinnati, Derby, Bradley & Co.
1846); STARKIE, supra note 143; STORY, supra note 292, at 263; 2 THOMAS W.
WATERMAN, THE AMERICAN CHANCERY DIGEST 539 (N.Y., Banks, Gould & Co. 3d
ed. 1851); JOHN WILLARD, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 361-62, 387
(N.Y., Banks & Brothers 1863). Many of these treatises went through multiple
editions before 1868.
296. Edward Ingraham, the American editor of Thomas Starkie's 1813
treatise, went so far as to correct the misleading impression left by Starkie's
quotation of Lord Ellenborough's "hasty dictum" in Du Bost v. Beresford. See
STARKIE, supra note 143, at 143 n.1. Starkie's English editors subsequently
corrected him also. See FOLKARD 4th ed., supra note 276, at 162 n.r, 551-52.
297. 8 Paige Ch. 24. See also Meyerson, supra note 11, at 324-25 (discussing
Brandreth).
298. See, e.g., OLIVER BARBOUR, AN ANALYTICAL DIGEST OF THE EQUITY CASES
294, 580 (Springfield, G. & C. Merriam 1843); 2 STORY, supra note 292, at 263
n.1; TOWNSHEND 1st ed., supra note 265, at 46 n.26; 2 WATERMAN, supra note
295; WILLARD, supra note 295.
299. See, e.g., Kidd v. Horry, 28 F. 773, 775 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1886); Carleton v.
Rugg, 22 N.E. 55, 57 (Mass. 1889); Life Ass'n of Am. v. Boogher, 3 Mo. App. 173,
179 (Ct. App. 1876); Hovey v. Rubber Tip Pencil Co., 57 N.Y. 119, 122 (1874)
(arguments of counsel of both sides); 1 CHARLES FISK BEACH, JR., MODERN
EQUITY: COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS, 73 n.4 (Albany, H.B.
Parsons 1895); HIGH 1st ed., supra note 153, at 377 n.7; 2 JOSEPH STORY WITH
REVISIONS AND ADDITIONS BY F.V. BALCH, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE: AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 150 n.2 (Boston,
Little, Brown, & Co., 11th ed. 1873); TOWNSHEND 2d ed. , supra note 106, at 91
n.1. See also Freeman, supra note 18, at 172 (describing Brandreth as the
"leading American case").
300. Other reasons include the stature of the New York court and its
Chancellor, the celebrity of the plaintiff, and the extreme nature of the libel
that Chancellor Walworth refused to enjoin. On the plaintiffs notoriety, see
infra note 303 (discussing Benjamin Brandreth).
301. Brandreth, 8 Paige Ch. at 26. These comments are from the opening
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Brandreth involved a pamphlet written by Lance, who
was a "disgruntled former employee"30 2 of Brandreth's
Vegetable and Universal Pill company. Brandreth's
company produced a patent medicine that was wildly
popular in the mid-nineteenth century. 303 Lance's pamphlet
purported to be the autobiography of Benjamin Brandling
who was described as a "child of many fathers,... [a]
bagman,... [a] pill vendor, [and a] money broker."304
Brandling was readily identifiable as Benjamin Brandreth,
Lance's former employer. The pamphlet was admittedly
"racy"30 5 and filled with "[a]morous [i]ntrigues."30 6 Because
it was, in Brandreth's view, a "highly injurious libel...
intended to... bring him into public disgrace and
contempt,"30 7 Brandreth applied to New York's Court of
Chancery to restrain the pamphlet's publication and
distribution.
Chancellor Walworth dismissed Brandreth's request in
a concise opinion that is worth quoting at some length to
convey its force, principles, and depth of familiarity with
the history of the point. Walworth began his opinion by
announcing:
It is very evident that this court cannot assume jurisdiction of the
case presented by the complainant's bill, or of any other case of the
like nature, without infringing upon the liberty of the press, and
attempting to exercise a power of preventive justice which, as the
Legislature has decided, cannot safely be entrusted to any tribunal
sentence of the Walworth's opinion, quoted infra text accompanying note 308.
302. Jerold S. Auerbach, The Patrician as Libertarian: Zechariah Chafee, Jr.
and Freedom of Speech, 42 NEw ENG. Q. 511 (1969). See also Brandreth, 8 Paige
Ch. at 24.
303. See JAMES YOUNG, THE TOADSTOOL MILLIONAIRES: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
PATENT MEDICINES IN AMERICA BEFORE FEDERAL REGULATION 75-89 (1961)
(discussing Brandreth and his pills). Brandreth, who was born in England,
came to America in 1835 with little money. Id. at 76. His pills, a powerful
purgative, proved so popular that by 1839 his net worth was $200,000. Id. at
77. By 1839, Brandreth was the "ne plus ultra of American nostrum-making,"
id., and remained so throughout his life. See id. at 88-89; see also Funeral of Dr.
Brandreth, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1880, at 8; Amy Wilentz, In Cold Type: Head
for the Hills, THE NATION, Sept. 16, 2002, at 37 (discussing Brandreth Park, a
24,038 acre Adirondack preserve bought by Brandreth in 1851).
304. Brandreth, 8 Paige Ch. at 25 (in table of contents of pamphlet).
305. Id. (in subtitle of pamphlet).
306. Id. (in title of pamphlet).
307. Id.
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consistently with the principles of a free government.
308
After describing Brandreth's bill, Walworth continued
by describing the cruel punishments inflicted on libelers by
the Star Chamber,30 9 voiced his belief that the Star
Chamber "was undoubtedly in the habit of restraining the
publications of... libels by injunction,"310 and observed:
"Since that court was abolished,... I believe there is but one
case upon record in which any court, either in this country
or in England, has attempted, by an injunction or order of
the court, to prohibit or restrain the publication of a
libel."311
That case was Henry Carr's Case,312 which Walworth
discounted as a precedent decided by "the notorious
Scroggs" that "no judge or chancellor from that time to the
present has attempted to follow. '313
Having described and accounted for the absence of
precedent favoring Brandreth, Walworth proceeded to raise
and contemptuously dismiss Chief Justice Ellenborough's
dicta in Du Bost v. Beresford as "a hasty declaration, made
without reflection during the progress of a trial... and... not
entitled to any weight whatever."314 After going so far as to
wonder whether Eldon's practice of restraining the
308. Id. at 26. For support for his comment about the legislature, Walworth
cited 2 R.S. 737 § 1 and Revisers' note. That statute allowed judges to require
bonds for good behavior from "any person . . . convicted of any criminal
offen[s]e" but exempted "convictions for writing or publishing any libel." 2 REV.
STAT. OF THE STATE OF N.Y. 617-18, § 1 (1836).
309. Brandreth, 8 Paige Ch. at 26 (listing punishments such as cutting off
ears, branding foreheads, and slitting noses).
310. Id. Walworth voiced a widely-shared, but historically inaccurate view
here. See supra note 106 (discussing whether the Star Chamber restrained
publications).
311. Brandreth, 8 Paige Ch. at 26-27.
312. See supra text accompanying notes 100-04 (discussing Carr's Case).
313. Brandreth, 8 Paige Ch. at 27.
314. Id. The Westlaw version of Brandreth has a footnote just after the
quoted material that gives similarly disparaging treatment to Chancellor
Parker's remarks in Burnett v. Chetwood. That footnote does not appear in the
first edition of Alonzo Paige's report of the case, published in 1842, so I do not
attribute it to Chancellor Walworth. I have not been able to locate the footnote's
original source. Most likely, it is a mid-nineteenth century addition by an editor
of a subsequent edition of Paige's reports that reflects the mid-nineteenth
century's disparaging view of Burnett.
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publication of letters on the ground of copyright
infringement might "to some extent endanger the freedom
of the press,"3 15 Walworth concluded his pithy opinion by
saying,
[Although [the pamphlet] is unquestionably intended as a gross
libel upon the complainant personally, this court has no
jurisdiction or authority to interfere for his protection. And if the
defendants persist in their intention of giving this libelous
production to the public, [Brandreth] must seek his remedy by a
civil suit in a court of law or by instituting a criminal prosecution,
to the end that the libelers, upon conviction, may receive their
appropriate punishment, in the penitentiary or otherwise. 316
One state case, even one as emphatic as Brandreth,
usually is insufficient to support a claim that there was a
nation-wide understanding of a particular point of law. But,
as previously discussed, Brandreth's forceful
pronouncement was mixed into a supporting context of
English case law and English and American scholarly
commentary that uniformly agreed with it.317 This
unanimity of opinion across the legal profession in both
America and England must be taken as determinative of
the expectations of the generation that wrote and ratified
the Fourteenth Amendment. As Joseph Story wrote in the
edition of his Equity Jurisprudence treatise published
shortly after the Brandreth decision:
Courts of Equity... have never assumed, at least, since the
destruction of the Court of the Star Chamber, to restrain any
publication, which purports to be a literary work, upon the mere
ground, that it is of a libellous character, and tends to the
degradation or injury of the reputation or business of the plaintiff,
who seeks relief against such a publication. For, matters of this
sort do not properly fall within the jurisdiction of Courts of Equity
to redress; but are cognizable, in a civil or criminal suit, at law. 318
315. Brandreth, 8 Paige Ch. at 28.
316. Id. at 28-29.
317. See supra text accompanying notes 268-80, 292-96 (discussing English
case law and English and antebellum American treatises on defamation,
injunctions, and equity).
318. 2 STORY, supra note 292, at 263. Story's comment, which clearly was
added in light of the Brandreth decision, did not appear in earlier editions. See
id. at n.1 (citing Gee v. Pritchard and Brandreth). It was included in all
subsequent editions.
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b. After 1868. The claim that by Reconstruction the
no injunction for defamation rule was the American rule is
evidenced not only by the Brandreth case and Story's and
other antebellum treatise writers' commentaries, but also
by a plethora of American decisional law and scholarly
commentary published just after the Fourteenth
Amendment's ratification. This tide of post-ratification
material is so uniform and close to the ratification period
that it should be taken to reflect-as it instantiates-the
understanding of the generation that framed and ratified
the Fourteenth Amendment. 319
After the Civil War, American treatises on libel,320
injunctions, 321  and equity jurisprudence 322  uniformly
continued to assert the no-injunction rule. After 1877, this
assertion regarding the American position was made with
knowledge of, and comparison to, England's recession from
the rule.323 The English recession, they thought, did not
319. In addition, in some approaches to originalism contemporaneous
precedent may properly determine the meaning of ambiguous or vague
constitutional text. See Barnett, supra note 26, at 265-69.
320. See TOWNSHEND 2d ed., supra note 106, at 90-91. This treatise had
multiple editions before 1900.
321. See HIGH 1st ed., supra note 153, at 377, 404; FRANCIS HILLIARD, LAW
OF INJUNCTIONS 480 (Philadelphia, Kay & Brother, 2d ed. 1869); WILLIAM
WILLIAMSON KERR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INJUNCTIONS IN
EQUITY 2, 507 (London, William Maxwell & Son, 1st Am. ed. 1871). These
treatises had multiple editions before 1900.
322. See POMEROY, supra note 266, at 351 n.3; 2 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 138 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co.,
10th ed. 1870). These treatises had multiple editions before 1900.
323. See 1 BEACH, supra note 299, at 73, 87-88; 2 JAMES HIGH, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS 968-70 (4th ed. 1905); MARTIN L. NEWELL, THE LAW
OF LIBEL AND SLANDER IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES 246a-b (Chicago, Callaghan
& Co., 2d ed. 1898); W. BLAKE ODGERS, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF LIBEL AND
SLANDER 12-16 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1st Am. ed. 1881); 3 CARTER PITKIN
POMEROY & JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
2091-92 (2d ed. 1892); CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE 565 (St. Louis, F.H. Thomas Law Book Co. 1893); TOWNSHEND
4th ed., supra note 265, at 687-93. Most commentators simply described the
difference, tracing the English practice to Parliament's specific authorization
through legislation enacted in the 1870s. One early twentieth century
commentator, after discussing the English practice, went on to say, "In this
country, courts of equity have generally refused to enjoin trade libels, on the
ground that the courts cannot abridge the constitutional right of free speech;
and in accordance with the rule, that equity cannot enjoin the crime of
publishing a libel or slander." 1 HOWARD C. JOYCE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
RELATING TO INJUNCTIONS 784 (1909) (footnotes omitted). See also THOMAS C.
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rest "on general principles of equity," but on special
Parliamentary statutes that had not been "introduced...
into our jurisprudence. '324
Similarly, between 1868 and 1890, three state supreme
courts 325 and two federal circuit courts326 asserted the no-
injunction rule. Between 1890 and 1900, five more state
supreme courts and federal courts followed suit. 327 As with
the treatise writers, after 1877 the American judiciary
made their rulings with full awareness of English
developments. 328
In adopting the no-injunction rule, some American
judges, even in their initial rulings in the early 1870s,
simply relied on authority and treated the no-injunction
position as "well settled. ' 329 Others explained that the
recent English recession from the rule was based on
"statutory provisions conferring such jurisdiction"330 that
had not been adopted in this country. Still others explained
that any position other than the no-injunction rule was
SPELLING, A TREATISE ON THE LAW GOVERNING INJUNCTIONS 266 (1926).
324. 2 BEACH, supra note 282, at 850. See also 3 POMEROY, supra note 266,
at 390 (English recession "not based" on "inherent powers of equity"). But see
Robert P. Clapp, Note, Hermann Loog v. Bean, 32 AM. L. REG. 701, 707-11
(1884).
325. See Singer Mgf. Co. v. Domestic Sewing Machine Co., 49 Ga. 70, 73-74
(1873); State ex rel. Liversey v. Judge of the Civil Dist. Ct., 34 La. Ann. 741,
745-46 (1882); Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Mfg. Co., 114 Mass. 69, 70-71
(1873). Several lower state courts did so, too. See, e.g., Life Ass'n of Am. v.
Boogher, 3 Mo. App. 173, 174-80 (1876); N.Y. Juvenile Guardian Soc'y v.
Roosevelt, 7 Daly 188 (N.Y. Ct. C.P. 1877) (following Brandreth v. Lance).
326. See Balt. Car-Wheel Co. v. Bemis, 29 F. 95, 95 (C.C.D. Mass. 1886);
Kidd v. Horry, 28 F. 773, 775-76 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1886).
327. See Balliet v. Cassidy, 104 F. 704, 705-06 (C.C.D. Or. 1900); Daily v.
Super. Ct., 44 P. 458, 460 (Ca. 1896); Reyes v. Middleton, 17 So. 937, 939-40
(Fla. 1895); Corliss v. E.W. Walker, 57 F. 434, 436 (C.C.D. Mass. 1893); Flint v.
Hutchinson Smoke Burner Co., 19 S.W. 804, 806 (Mo. 1892). Several lower state
courts applied the no-injunction rule also. See, e.g., Everett Piano Co. v. Bent,
60 Ill. App. 372; Jordan v. O'Connor, 17 N.Y.S. 462 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1891).
328. See, e.g., Kidd, 28 F. at 774-76; Flint, 19 S.W. at 805-06; Green v. U.S.
Dealers' Protective Ass'n & Mercantile Agency, 39 Hun. 300, 301 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1885).
329. Singer Mfg. Co., 49 Ga. at 73. See also Balt. Car-Wheel Co., 29 F. at 95
("settled law"); Boston Diatite Co., 114 Mass. at 70 ("well settled principles");
N.Y. Juvenile Guardian Soc'y, 7 Daly at 189-90 (relying on Brandreth and its
free speech rationale).
330. Balt. Car-Wheel Co., 29 F. at 95.
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prohibited by constitutional principles of free speech and
jury trial.331
Three cases well illustrate the Reconstruction-era
judiciary's appreciation of the constitutional dimensions of
the no injunction for defamation rule. The first is Life
Association of America v. Boogher332  decided by the
Missouri Appellate Court in 1876. 333 In Boogher, the
insurance company petitioned for an injunction restraining
Boogher and others from continuing to write and circulate
libels about the company that injured its credit and
business reputation. 334 After coming to the conclusion that
common law precedent clearly did not support the grant of
an injunction, 335 the Missouri court added
In Missouri, where we are expressly forbidden by the Constitution
to assume the power we are asked by the plaintiff to exercise, our
answer cannot be doubtful. It is hardly necessary to quote the
familiar language of our organic law, which has always declared
"that every person may freely speak, write, or print on any subject,
being responsible for the abuse of that liberty."
If it be said that the right to speak, write, or print, thus secured to
every one, cannot be construed to mean a license to wantonly
injure another.... our answer is that we have no power to suspend
331. See infra text accompanying notes 332-71. For cases outside my time
period, but still expressly relying on constitutional norms, see infra note 366
(citing early twentieth century federal cases).
332. 3 Mo. App. 173 (1876).
333. The Appellate Court's principles were endorsed by the state Supreme
Court in Flint, which relied on free speech and jury trial arguments saying, in
part:
We live under a written constitution which declares that the right of
trial by jury shall remain inviolate; and the question of libel or no libel,
slander or no slander, is one for a jury to determine. Such was certainly
the settled law when the various constitutions of this state were
adopted, and it is all-important that the right thus guarded should not
be disturbed. It goes hand in hand with the liberty of the press and free
speech.
19 S.W. at 806. I emphasize the Appellate Court decision, however, because it is
closer in time to the Fourteenth Amendment's framing and ratification and,
therefore, more persuasively reflects the understanding of that time.
334. See Life Ass'n, 3 Mo. App. at 174-76; State v. Boogher, 3 Mo. App. 442,
443 (1877) (discussing Boogher's appeal from his criminal libel conviction,
discussed infra text accompanying notes 340-44).
335. Life Ass'n, 3 Mo. App. at 177-79 (reviewing precedent in England and
America and finding that there is "no case . . . in which the jurisdiction here
claimed has been exercised").
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that right for a moment, or for any purpose. The sovereign power
has forbidden any instrumentality of the government it has
instituted to limit or restrain this right except by the fear of the
penalty, civil or criminal, which may wait on abuse. 33 6
Highlighting the court's commitment to the principles it
laid down was the fact that, according to the insurance
company, Boogher was "wholly insolvent" and not amenable
to an action for damages. 337 Yet, to the Missouri court,
Boogher's insolvency did not matter. According to the court,
"the freedom to speak and write, which is secured, by the
Constitution of Missouri, to all its citizens" should not be
"enjoyed by a man able to respond in damages to a civil
action, and denied to one who has no property liable to an
execution. ' 338 Concluding that "this discrimination was not
intended by the Framers of the organic law," the court
pointed to the availability of criminal punishment. 339
The court's gesture to criminal punishment was not
idle. Boogher was, in fact, prosecuted for criminal libel,
fined $150, and sentenced to two months in the St. Louis
work-house for the same facts upon which the Court had
denied an injunction. 340  When Boogher appealed his
criminal conviction, the Missouri Appellate Court evidenced
no problem with the propriety of criminal libel
prosecutions 341 even though the underlying facts involved
defamatory comments contained in a petition "by policy-
holders to the State Insurance Department, praying an
336. Id. at 179-80.
337. Id. at 175.
338. Id. at 176. See also Reyes v. Middleton, 17 So. 937, 939 (Fla. 1895) (also
holding that insolvency does not alter the rule).
339. Life Ass'n, 3 Mo. App. at 176. The Court hinted that criminal
punishment might be preferable because, unlike civil libel where truth was a
complete defense, truth was not a defense to a criminal charge if the libel was
circulated maliciously. Id. Boogher was criminally prosecuted. See infra text
accompanying notes 340-44. See also State ex rel. Liversey v. Judge of Civil
Dist. Ct., 34 La. Ann. 741, 747 (1882) (adopting no-injunction rule but
commending criminal prosecution).
340. State v. Boogher, 3 Mo. App. 442, 443 (1877).
341. Id. at 444-45. The Court reversed Boogher's conviction and ordered a
new trial. But this was due to the fortuity that the trial judge had died soon
after Boogher appealed his conviction. Under Missouri procedure, the trial
judge's untimely death denied Boogher an opportunity to perfect the bill of
exceptions required for appellate review. Id. at 448.
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examination of the affairs of the Life Association. ' 342
Reflecting the legal culture of its time, which frequently
upheld criminal libel prosecutions, 343  the Missouri
Appellate Court could not plausibly be said to be libertarian
by modern standards. Still, the Missouri court had no doubt
that even though Boogher abused his right of free speech,
he did not expose himself to an injunctive remedy. Free
speech norms required that Boogher be subject only to
subsequent punishment, not prior restraint.344 He could not
be enjoined from continuing to circulate his defamatory
petition.
The second case is State ex rel. Liversey v. Judge of
Civil District Court,345 decided by the Louisiana Supreme
Court in 1882. Liversey involved a request by W. Van
Benthuysen for an injunction restraining a newspaper, The
Mascot, from continuing to publish "false, malicious and
libellous cartoons and editorial[s]... defaming" him.346
Citing numerous sources, and quoting Benjamin Abbott and
Jean De Lolme, the Louisiana court ruled that the
injunction could not be granted because the state
constitution's free speech clause meant that "every person
may freely publish what he sees fit, and any judgment of
the law upon it shall be reserved till afterwards. ' 347
Enjoining libels, the Court said, would allow a "court... to
decide for itself, without trial by jury" what was "libellous
and defamatory, in contravention of the injunction."348 This
"would establish a complete censorship over the press so
enjoined" and "[u]nder... a subservient or corrupt judiciary,
the press might be completely muzzled, and its just
342. Id. at 443.
343. See id. at 445 (citing treatises and cases); infra text accompanying
notes 350-51 (discussing criminal prosecutions of scandal-sheet newspapers).
See also DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 23-57, 136-39,
149-52 (1997) (general discussion of free speech norms in the late-nineteenth
century).
344. In 1892, the Missouri Supreme Court suggested that an injunction
might be awarded after a jury determination that a publication was libelous.
Flint v. Hutchinson Smoke Burner Co., 19 S.W. 804, 806 (Mo. 1892). However, I
am unaware of any case in which this dicta was acted on.
345. 34 La. Ann. 741 (1882).
346. Id. at 741.
347. Id. at 743 (quoting Abbott's Law Dictionary). For the text that the
Court quoted from De Lolme, see supra text accompanying note 93.
348. Liversey, 34 La. Ann. at 745.
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influence upon public opinion entirely paralyzed. '349
Late nineteenth century legal culture had no hesitation
in permitting newspapers to be civilly sued or criminally
prosecuted for the libels they published.350 Gilded Age
courts even upheld statutes making it a crime to publish
newspapers "especially devoted to the publication of
scandals and accounts of lecherous and immoral
conduct. ' 351 But, as illustrated by Liversey and other
cases, 352 on all the "nice[ ],,353 questions involved in the law
of defamation, defendants "were entitled... to a trial by jury,
if they so desired. ' 354 Therefore, as the Louisiana Supreme
Court said:
It has passed into a settled rule of jurisprudence, that courts of
equity will not lend their aid to enjoin the publication of libels or
works of a libellous nature; even though the libellous publication is
calculated to injure the credit, business or character of the person
against whom it is directed. 355
349. Id.
350. See, e.g., Post Publ'g Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530 (6th Cir. 1893); Gibson v.
Cincinnati Enquirer, 10 F. Cas. 311 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1877) (No. 5392); Kelly,
supra note 85, at 439-40 (discussing cases but noting the beginning of a
liberalizing trend); TIEDEMAN, supra note 252, at 192-93 (advocating criminal
prosecution); J. TOWNSHEND, A TREATISE ON THE WRONGS CALLED SLANDER AND
LIBEL 166-68 (N.Y., Baker, Voorhis & Co., 3d ed. 1877) (discussing liability of
newspaper and book publishers and book sellers). Cf. United States v. Harmon,
45 F. 414 (D.C.D. Kan. 1891) (upholding conviction for mailing newspaper
considered obscene).
351. In re Banks, 42 P. 693, 694 (Kan. 1895). See also State v. McKee, 46 A.
409 (Conn. 1900); State v. Van Wye, 37 S.W. 938 (Mo. 1896).
352. See, e.g., Ulster Square Dealer v. Fowler, 111 N.Y.S. 16, 18 (Spec. Term
1908) (awarding an injunction to a newspaper to prevent public officials from
interfering with its publication, noting that for any offense "it ought to be a very
easy matter ... to secure prompt and adequate punishment"); Ex parte Neill, 22
S.W. 923 (Tex. Crim. App. 1893). Cf. Dailey v. Super. Ct., 44 P. 458 (Cal. 1896)
(refusing to enjoin the performance of a play depicting events in a pending
murder trial). As Professor Meyerson points out, these cases anticipated the
Supreme Court's landmark ruling in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
Meyerson, supra note 11, at 334-36.
353. Liversey, 34 La. Ann. at 745 ("No legal distinctions are nicer than those
concerning libellous and defamatory publications.").
354. Id. at 742 (summarizing argument of counsel).
355. Id. at 745 (internal quotation marks removed). See also Ex parte Neill,
22 S.W. 923, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 1893) ('The power to suppress one concedes
the power to suppress all.").
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The third case, Kidd v. Horry,356 decided in 1886 by
Supreme Court Justice Joseph Bradley while riding circuit,
made the connection between free speech and jury trial
even more explicit. The facts of Kidd are not fully stated.35 7
Apparently, Kidd and Horry were involved in a patent
infringement controversy. Pending trial of the patent claim,
Horry continued to seek business. This required Horry to
assure customers that dealing with him did not violate
Kidd's patent. Believing that Horry's denial of Kidd's patent
was a libel injurious to his business, Kidd asked that Horry
be enjoined from "publishing... circular letters" making the
claim at least until the patent suit's resolution.358
Justice Bradley regarded Kidd's request as "altogether
a novel one" that "is urged principally upon a line of recent
English authorities" that, for the first time, granted
injunctions for libel.359 These English precedents, Bradley
said, "depend... not on the general principles of equity
jurisprudence" but "on certain peculiar acts of parliament of
Great Britain. ' 360 It was a "new branch of equity" that
neither legislatures nor courts "ha[d] introduced.., into our
jurisprudence."361 Nor could they. For "charges of slander,"
Bradley said,
are peculiarly adapted to and require trial by jury; and exercising,
as we do, authority under a system of government and law which
by a fundamental article secures the right of trial by jury in all
cases at common law, and which by express statute declares that
suits in equity shall not be sustained in any case where a plain,
adequate, and complete remedy may be had at law, as has always
heretofore been considered the case in causes of libel and slander
we do not think that we would be justified in extending the
remedy of injunction to such cases. 36 2
Kidd v. Horry was the first federal case to squarely
356. 28 F. 773 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1886).
357. My understanding of the facts comes from what is said in Kidd and
from other suits at the time, both in England and America, involving
controversies in which competing businessmen brought libel actions.
358. Kidd, 28 F. at 774.
359. Id. at 774. All the cases referred to by Justice Bradley arose from
business controversies.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 775.
362. Id. at 776.
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address equity's power to enjoin defamation. 363 Justice
Bradley discussed the question "so fully and clearly"364 that
the no-injunction rule was quickly adopted by most other
federal courts with little more than a quotation from, or
citation to, his opinion in Kidd.365 Before the century's end, it
was clear that Justice Bradley had stated the federal rule.366
No doubt, Kidd's acceptance was furthered by the fact
that a few months before Justice Bradley stated his view,
the full Supreme Court had signaled a similar position in
Francis v. Flinn.367 Francis was a diversity suit over
piloting rights. In denying Flinn's application for an
injunction restraining an allegedly wide-spread conspiracy
from injuring his piloting business, Justice Field had
written,
If the publications in the newspapers are false and injurious,
[Flinn] can prosecute the publishers for libel. If a court of equity
could interfere and use its remedy of injunction in such cases, it
would draw to itself the greater part of the litigation properly
belonging to courts of law. 36 8
Some federal courts treated Francis as authoritatively
settling the no injunction for defamation rule. 36 9 However,
Francis's discussion was thin. Justice Field asserted his
conclusion in passing and never explicated why he thought
363. A few months before Kidd, the United States Supreme Court
mentioned the subject in dicta that supported the no-injunction rule. See infra
text accompanying notes 367-68 (discussing Francis v. Flinn, 118 U.S. 385
(1886)).
364. Balt. Car-Wheel Co. v. Bemis, 29 F. 95 (C.C.D. Mass. 1886).
365. See, e.g., Balliet v. Cassidy, 104 F. 704, 705 (C.C.D. Or. 1900); Corliss v.
E.W. Walker Co., 57 F. 434, 435 (C.C.D. Mass. 1893) (citing other authorities
also); Balt. Car Wheel Co., 29 F. at 95.
366. Justice Bradley's view remained the federal view well into the
twentieth century. Some subsequent cases are noteworthy for their strong
affirmation of the free speech and jury trial basis for the rule. See Citizens'
Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Montgomery Light & Water Power Co., 171 F. 553,
556-57 (C.C.M.D. Ala. 1909); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. S.D. Retail Merch. &
Hardware Dealers' Ass'n, 150 F. 413, 418 (C.C.D.S.D. 1907); Willis v. O'Connell,
231 F. 1004, 1010-11 (S.D. Ala. 1916).
367. 118 U.S. 385 (1886).
368. Id. at 389.
369. See, e.g., A.B. Farquhar Co. v. Nat'l Harrow Co., 99 F. 160, 161-62
(C.C.D.J. 1900); Int'l Tooth-Crown Co. v. Carmichael, 44 F. 350, 351 (C.C.E.D.
Wis. 1890).
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defamation litigation "properly belong[ed]" in the law
courts. 370 Courts tended to draw from Kidd v. Horry's more
elaborate discussion.371 Kidd was the leading decision; but
Francis's off-hand dicta, proceeding as it did from a greater
authority, surely complemented it.372
Admiration of the traditional no-injunction rule was not
universal in post-Reconstruction America. In 1877,
Abraham Clark Freeman, a prominent lawyer and legal
commentator published a short Note in The Central Law
Journal that was bitterly critical of the rule.373 In his Note,
Freeman reviewed the course of English and American
precedent and frankly, "[c]onced[ed]... as we must, that the
authorities overwhelmingly establish the proposition that
equity has no jurisdiction to restrain the publication of a
libel, even though its publication threatens to prove ruinous
to personal reputation, or to rights of property, or to both. '374
Freeman also allowed that among the reasons the
authorities had for adopting the no-injunction rule were the
beliefs that enjoining libel "would impair the right to trial
by jury" and that "it would be dangerous to concede to
equity any control over the liberty of speech and of the
press."
3 75
Yet to Freeman, these considerations were
insufficiently persuasive. The jury argument failed because
370. Francis, 118 U.S. at 389.
371. Between 1886 and 1900, federal and state courts cited Kidd twenty
times and Francis nine times. Westlaw, http://www.westlaw.com (separate
searches of the databases "allstates" and "allfeds" with the terms 'Kidd v.
Horry' & date(aft 1885 & bef 1901)" and 'Francis v. Flinn' & date(aft 1885 &
bef 1901)") (last visited July 23, 2007). The "Kidd v. Horry" search produced 24
hits, 20 of which cited Kidd for the no-injunction rule. The "Francis v. Flinn"
search produced 10 hits, 9 of which cited Francis for the no-injunction rule.
372. Courts often cited them together. See, e.g., Citizens' Light, Heat &
Power Co., 171 F. at 557; Edison v. Thomas A. Edison, Jr. Chem. Co., 128 F.
957, 963 (C.C.D. Del. 1904); Coeur D'Alene Consol. & Mining Co. v. Miners'
Union of Wardner, 51 F. 260, 265 (C.C.D. Idaho 1892); Mitchell v. Grand Lodge
Free & Accepted Masons of Texas, 121 S.W. 178, 179 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909);
Marlin Firearms Co. v. Shields, 64 N.E. 163, 166 (N.Y. 1902).
373. See generally Freeman, supra note 18. See also Clapp, supra note 324,
at 705 (criticizing the rule).
374. Freeman, supra note 18, at 173.
375. Id. Freeman also noted that the rule was alternatively grounded on the
principles that equity did not enjoin crime or intervene when there was an
adequate remedy at law. Id.
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"if injunctions [were] refused in every case in which an
issue of fact can be formed, then they must soon become
obsolete. '376 The free speech concern was insufficient
because "[t]he power of the press is so great, and the
necessity... of permitting... fair.., criticism of public and
private persons is so obvious, that, were the power to enjoin
libels conceded, we might rest assured that it would be
exercised in none but the clearest cases."377
Apparently, few in Freeman's generation were as ready
as he to trust the judiciary and to discount the jury's role in
protecting defamation defendants from governmentally
imposed liability. Although Freeman's criticism anticipated
Roscoe Pound's seminal article by forty years, 378 it had little
to no impact in its own day.
More influential was the critique offered in 1888 by
Judge Henry Blodgett when he decided Emack v. Kane.379
Emack involved a dispute between two businessmen who
made competing 'noiseless' or 'muffled' slates for [the] use
of school children. ' 38 0 Kane held a patent that he claimed
Emack's slate infringed.38 ' Rather than sue Emack to
establish the validity of his patent claim, Kane repeatedly
sent letters and circulars to Emack's potential customers
threatening to hold them "responsible for royalty and
damages" should they use Emack's slate. 38 2
In Blodgett's view, it was likely that Kane chose this
course of action because of the doubtful validity of his
patent.38 3 Yet even with a doubtful patent, threatening
Emack's customers with infringement actions could serve
Kane's purpose because businessmen typically try to "avoid[ ]...
376. Id. Freeman's claim that the jury argument proved too much fails to
realize that the jury's role in free speech controversies was unique and,
therefore, distinguishable from other civil actions.
377. Id. Freeman did compliment the free speech argument by saying "if
there is any reason why equity ought not to interfere, this is the true one." Id.
378. See infra text accompanying notes 401-07 (discussing Pound's
analysis).
379. 34 F. 46 (C.C.N.D. Il. 1888).
380. Id. at 47.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 48.
383. See id. at 51-52. Kane's slate may not have been sufficiently original to
qualify for a patent given the existing state of the art. Id. at 52.
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lawsuit[s] of any kind" and "a suit for infringement of a
patent is so far outside of the common man's experience
that he is terrorized by even a threat of such a suit. ' 38 4 In
applying to Blodgett's court for an injunction, all Emack
was asking for was to prevent Kane from "threatening 385
Emack's customers under a pretextual claim of patent
infringement. "[Sluch acts of intimidation," Blodgett said,
"should fall within the preventive reach of a court of equity....
I cannot believe that a man is remediless against persistent
and continued attacks upon his business.... It shocks my
sense of justice to say that a court of equity cannot restrain
systematic and methodical outrages like this."38 6
With these words, Judge Blodgett carved an exception
out of the no-injunction rule premised on Kane's
intimidation of Emack's customers. This was a limited
exception based on unfair competition and not what a later
court called "mere libels. '' 38 7 As explained in a subsequent
case,
[w]here notices are given or circulars distributed in good faith to
warn against infringement, no wrong whatever is committed; but
where... they are not made or issued with such intent, but in bad
faith, and solely for the purpose of destroying the business of
another, a very different case is presented. In such a case property
rights are fraudulently assailed, and a court of chancery, whose
interposition is invoked for their protection, should not refuse to
accord it. 3
88
Soon, the exception Blodgett made for enjoining speech
intended to intimidate a competitor's customers was
expanded beyond patent disputes and applied to what the
late nineteenth century judiciary conceived as the
inherently threatening and coercive speech involved in
384. Id.
385. Id. at 50.
386. Id.
387. Lewin v. Welsbach Light Co., 81 F. 904, 907 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1897).
388. A.B. Farquhar Co. v. Nat'l Harrow Co., 102 F. 714, 715 (3d Cir. 1900).
In deciding Emack v. Kane, Judge Blodgett made the same point about
distinguishing good and bad faith notice of potential liability to the competitor's
customers. See Emack, 34 F. at 50 ("[N]otice of an alleged infringement may, if
given in good faith, be a considerate and kind act on the part of the owner of the
patent; but the gravamen of this case is the attempted intimidation .. .of
complainant's customers by threatening them with suits which defendants did
not intend to prosecute.").
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labor boycotts and strikes.38 9 Still, by the turn of the
century, and for many years after, these were the only
inroads made into the traditional no injunction for
defamation rule. 390
In sum, the Reconstruction Era understood the no
injunction for defamation rule as firmly established and
premised on precedent, the right of free speech, and the
right to a jury trial.391 No exceptions arose until twenty
years after the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption. The no-
injunction rule was part of a system of free speech that
included a prominent role for a jury of one's peers. To
protect speech and press freedoms, Reconstruction Era
constitutional norms provided speakers with a double
protection that barred either criminal or civil liability
unless .'[t]he prosecutor, or plaintiff,.., gets both the court
and the jury to decide for him.' 392
III. CONCLUSION: JURIES AND INJUNCTIONS FOR DEFAMATION
Originalists, whether they focus on 1789 or 1868,
should find that the Constitution's protection of free speech
includes a bar on injunctions for defamation. Their view
should be that the only remedies for defamation are
damages, both compensatory and punitive, and criminal
prosecution. In addition, they should hold that no liability
389. See, e.g., Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical Union No. 3, 45 F. 135, 144
(C.C.S.D. Ohio 1891) (relying on Emack); Beck v. Ry. Teamsters' Protective
Union, 77 N.W. 13, 20-23 (Mich. 1898).
390. See MARTIN L. NEWELL & MASON H. NEWELL, THE LAW OF SLANDER AND
LIBEL IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES 214-16, 244-45, 247 (4th ed. 1924)
(summarizing American law); Meyerson, supra note 11, at 330-33 (discussing
labor injunctions); Note, The Jurisdiction of Equity in Cases of Libel, 2 COLUM.
L. REV. 175, 176 (1902) (stating exceptions to the rule). In addition, there was a
suggestion, made in Flint v. Hutchinson Smoke Burner Co., 19 S.W. 804, 806
(Mo. 1892), that libel plaintiffs might be entitled to an injunction after a jury
verdict if it banned only that which the jury found defamatory, but this
suggestion was never acted upon.
391. Again, there were additional reasons, such as the force of precedent
and the principle that equity had no jurisdiction to enjoin criminal activity. See
supra text accompanying notes 329, 374-75 (discussing Reconstruction Era
precedent and Abraham Freeman's article).
392. Hazy v. Woitke, 48 P. 1048, 1049 (Colo. 1897) (quoting Capital &
Counties Bank v. Henty, 7 App. Cas. 741, 776 (H.L. 1882) (per Lord
Blackburn)). See also supra note 267 (citing and discussing other material
employing this quote).
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can be imposed in a defamation action without a jury
verdict against the defendant. Consistent with the
understanding of the First and Fourteenth Amendments'
Framers and ratifiers, judges may non-suit defamation
plaintiffs and grant directed verdicts and judgments N.O.V.
against them.393  But it is inconsistent with the
Constitution's original meaning for judges to take cases
away from juries and rule against defamation defendants.
In defamation suits, the First and Fourteenth Amendments
require an exception to the symmetrical use of modern jury
control devices.
Admittedly, these conclusions are not as clear for the
Founding era as they are for the Reconstruction period. Yet,
in determining the constitutional limitations imposed by
the Fourteenth Amendment, originalists should focus on
the experiences, principles, and expectations of the Civil
War generation. Even if the Framers and ratifiers of the
Fourteenth Amendment misconceived the free speech
principles of the Founding era (which, in this case I do not
believe they did), it is an example of "communis error facitjus."394 It was, after all, their understanding of speech and
press freedoms that they were constitutionalizing.
However, not everyone is an originalist 395 and some
originalists are "faint-hearted."3 96 For non- or faint-hearted
393. There is also no free speech impediment to judges granting summary
judgment motions against defamation plaintiffs. See 2 SMOLLA, supra note 5, §§
12:69-12:75.
394. For historical and normative explorations of the "communis error"
maxim, see Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1,
20 (1984) and Michael P. Healy, Communis Opinio and the Methods of
Statutory Interpretation: Interpreting Law or Changing Law, 43 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 539 (2001).
395. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 129-41
(1987) (discussing "open-ended modernism"); JEFFREY M. SHAMAN,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: ILLUSION AND REALITY 1-25 (2001) (discussing
"constitutional creativity"); Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120
HARv. L. REV. 1737, 1750-57 (2007); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser
Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 9, 862, 864 (1989). But see Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and
Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 292 (2007) (arguing that "the
debate between originalism and living constitutionalism rests on a false
dichotomy").
396. Scalia, supra note 395, at 862. Some jurists are also inconsistently
originalist. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply to the Right, 10
GREEN BAG 2D 423, 428 (2007) (discussing affirmative action); David M.
Zlotnick, Justice Scalia and His Critics: An Exploration of Scalia's Fidelity to
His Constitutional Methodology, 48 EMORY L.J. 1377, 1416-17 (1999) (discussing
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originalists, the constitutionality of the no-injunction rule is
an open question with strong arguments on both sides.397
Concern for the chilling (if not freezing) effect of a prior
restraint 398 and the inevitable overbreath of any effective
injunction 399 need to be balanced against concern for the
maligned plaintiff who is likely suffering economic,
reputational, and emotional injury from an unending
stream of untruthful invective.40 0  As an historical
exploration, this Article cannot settle the argument among
non-originalists. However, by emphasizing the importance
of juries in the system of free speech that underlay the
adoption of the rule, this Article establishes some additional
normative support for the no-injunction rule. In addition,
this Article indicates that if there is to be a retreat from the
no-injunction rule, the First Amendment should be
interpreted to require that certain limits and safeguards
centered on jury participation accompany it.
Pound and subsequent commentators recognized jury
trial as an important rationale for the no-injunction rule.401
As Pound acknowledged, there was "a clear policy in favor
of jury trial of an issue of truth in a charge of
defamation"40 2 and this policy was "a serious difficulty in
the way of injunctions in [defamation] cases." 40 3 Still,
Pound argued,
where it is admitted that the publication is false, or the falsity is
originalists on a variety of issues).
397. See, e.g., Balboa Island Vill. Inn v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 354-57 (Cal.
2007) (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting) (supporting no-injunction rule);
Bertelsman, supra note 19, at 320 (supporting injunctions); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Injunctions in Defamation Cases, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 157, 163-
72 (2007) (supporting no-injunction rule); Gold, supra note 19, at 231-41
(supporting injunctions); Sedler, supra note 19, at 159-60 (supporting
injunctions).
398. Balboa Island, 156 P.3d at 354, 357.
399. See Chemerinsky, supra note 397, at 171-72.
400. See Emack v. Kane, 34 F. 46, 50 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1888); Transcript of Oral
Argument at 7-12, Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734 (2005), 2005 WL 752743
(showing various Justices expressing sympathy for plaintiff); Bertelsman, supra
note 19, at 320; Gold, supra note 19, at 232; Pound, supra note 17, at 668.
401. See Bertelsman, supra note 19, at 323; Pound, supra note 17, at 642,
655-57; Sedler, supra note 19, at 153-54. See also Freeman, supra note 18, at
173 (commentator anticipating Pound's recognition of the jury trial rationale).
402. Pound, supra note 17, at 656.
403. Id. at 657.
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so clear that there is really nothing for a jury to try, then, trial by
jury being a mere form-there being no substantial occasion for
it-the policy in question should not stand in the way of an
injunction.... Hence the requirement of trial by jury is no more an
obstacle here than in the case of equity jurisdiction to enjoin
trespass, disturbance of easements, or nuisance.
40 4
Although Pound's response to the jury trial rationale
has been treated by subsequent commentators as
definitive,405 it is insufficient. What Pound's analysis misses
is that, unlike in other civil actions, the jury's function in
defamation actions traditionally was understood to be more
than fact determination, even if we extend fact
determination to include the answer to that mixed question
of law and fact: libel vel non. Traditionally, the jury's
function was to act as a tribune of the people; to be a
popular institution with veto power over government
sanctions for speech. It was, as Jean Louis De Lolme and
others of the Revolutionary Era pointed out, the absence or
presence of the jury that accounted for England's different
approach to prior and subsequent restraints.40 6 The no
injunction for defamation rule was part of a system of free
speech that barred government from censoring or punishing
speech without popular participation and approval. In other
words, if Pound thought it was appropriate to enjoin
defamation when the facts were so clear that a judge would
direct a jury verdict against the defendant, the answer is
that there is no such case. 40 7
This is not to say that the jury's check on governmental
sanctions of speech is an entirely satisfactory protection. 408
Juries may protect popular speakers from suppression and
punishment by unpopular or faithless officials. But they
tend not to protect speakers of whom the majority
disapproves. The Founding generation learned this bitter
404. Id.
405. See Bertelsman, supra note 19, at 323; Sedler, supra note 19, at 154.
Abraham Freeman, after recognizing the jury trial rationale, made a similar
rebuttal. He argued that the rationale proved too much because it would
prevent injunctions in all cases. Freeman, supra note 18, at 173. His response is
insufficient for the same reasons discussed here.
406. See supra text accompanying notes 93-97 (discussing De Lolme).
407. See supra text accompanying notes 40-45, 259-67.
408. For the comments in this paragraph see Amar, supra note 29, at 242-
44; Monaghan, supra note 248, at 526-360
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lesson during the Sedition Act trials. The South's treatment
of abolitionist speakers before the Civil War and in the
treatment of speakers advocating African-American rights
and equal treatment after that conflict repeated this lesson
for Reconstruction Era lawmakers. A century later, it was
reiterated during the Civil Rights struggles of the 1960s.
The inadequacy of juries as a protector of minority
speakers was addressed by the growth in the nineteenth-
century of judicial power to grant directed verdicts and
judgments N.O.V. against defamation plaintiffs. 409 In the
1960s, these powers were expanded to provide a panoply of
devices by which judges checked juries.410 The power of
judges to closely supervise defamation juries on behalf of
defamation defendants is appropriate on both originalist
and non-originalist grounds. It provides the double
protection expected by the Fourteenth Amendment's
Framers and ratifiers.411
Although the contemporary chastened view of the jury
in free speech litigation is welcome, it goes too far if taken
to require "the contraction.., of the jury's functions" in
defamation controversies. 412 Excluding the jury is as
inappropriate as entirely relying on it.413 Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, if not the First, a defamation
plaintiff should not "succeed unless he gets both the court
and the jury to decide for him."414
409. See supra text accompanying note 260.
410. See 2 SMOLLA, supra note 5, §§ 12:83-12:86 (describing expanded
judicial review appropriate in defamation cases); Monaghan, supra note 248, at
528-30 (describing a variety of devices).
411. See supra text accompanying notes 266-67, 391-92. I note that the
"double protection" was less clearly intended by the First Amendment's
Framers and Ratifiers and is another aspect of the Reconstruction Era's
clarifying light.
412. Bertelsman, supra note 19, at 323 n.19. Bertelsman relies on
Monaghan's analysis which suggests, incorrectly in my view, that "any
expansive conception of the jury's role is inconsistent with a vigorous
application of the first amendment." Monaghan, supra note 248, at 527. I
advocate an expansive, but closely supervised role for First Amendment juries.
413. But see Redish, supra note 19, at 63-66 (discounting the importance of
the jury).
414. See supra text accompanying note 267 (quoting and citing American
cases). The Court has neglected this principle in litigation involving film
licensing where it finds sufficient protection in the provision of prompt judicial
review. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (voiding licensing
scheme, not because of absence of jury, but for absence of prompt judicial
730 [Vol. 56
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For both originalists and non-originalists there is a
First Amendment 415 right to a jury trial in civil defamation
suits.4 1 6 The right applies whether the suit is for damages
or an injunction. 417  No permanent 418  injunction for
review).
415. In deference to conventional usage and to avoid cumbersome phrases,
here and for the remainder of the paper, my use of the term "First Amendment"
includes the constitutional norms of free speech and press imposed on the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. My claim is that the import of the
Fourteenth Amendment on the issues I discuss is clearer, not that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments are in conflict.
416. The defamation defendant's right to a jury trial requires a First
Amendment basis because the Seventh Amendment's civil jury provision has
not been incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. There is no general
federal constitutional right to a jury trial in civil actions tried in state court. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 505. State constitutions or statutes may provide
for it. Cf. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.6(2), at 153-54 (Practitioner
Treatise ser., 2d ed. 1993).
Should a defamation action be brought in federal court either because it
involves parties living in a federal territory, such as Washington, D.C., or
because of diversity of citizenship, the Seventh Amendment jury trial guarantee
would apply. However, it would not have all the ramifications discussed in this
article. See infra text accompanying notes 417-34 (discussing jury trial for
injunction actions and injunction enforcement actions). Thus, even in federal
court, it is important that the rights I discuss be understood as First
Amendment rights.
417. Especially with regard to actions brought only for an injunction, the
defamation defendant's right to a jury trial requires a First Amendment basis.
The Seventh Amendment jury trial right applies only to legal actions and not to
suits, such as suits requesting injunctions, that trace their origin to equity. See
WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 231, at 656-58.
It is unclear whether the recent Balboa Island Vill. Inn v. Lemen, 156 P.3d
339 (Cal. 2007), case violated this prescription. The plaintiff asked only for an
injunction which was awarded after a bench trial. Probably because the
defendant did not raise the issue, no opinion indicates whether California
procedure would have allowed her to insist on a jury.
418. Interim injunctions pending the outcome of litigation are a different
subject. Interim injunctions in speech controversies are highly disfavored. See,
e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (reversing grant
of interim injunction); Sid Dillon Chevrolet-Oldsmobile-Pontiac, Inc. v. Sullivan,
559 N.W.2d 740 (Neb. 1997) (overturning defamation injunction issued before
trial because of absence of jury determination but indicating approval of post-
trial injunctions); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DuKE L.J. 147, 169-78 (1998)
(reviewing a wide variety of preliminary injunction speech cases). It is difficult
to imagine a defamation case, especially when the action seeks to prevent
repetition of the remarks, that can meet the burden for interim orders. In
addition, it should be noted that late nineteenth-century England allowed
interim injunctions of libel pending trial but carefully circumscribed their
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defamation is permissible unless a jury has determined
that the defendant's speech is defamatory or the defendant
has waived his First Amendment right to a jury trial.
The rule that defamation cannot be enjoined without a
jury verdict is not entirely novel. It is the converse of the
suggestion that after a jury has found certain remarks to be
defamatory, equity may act to prevent their repetition.419
The view that a jury verdict removes the constitutional
impediments to enjoining defamation was the primary
rationale for the cases initiating the current retreat from
the no-injunction rule. 420 All I am pointing out is that the
warrant for the new departure is also a limit; and
emphasizing, more clearly than the recent cases, 421 that
injunctions for defamation are impermissible if the
defendant did not have a right to a jury trial.
It is more novel, however, to assert that the role of the
jury as a double protection for defamation defendants is not
exhausted by a verdict on liability. It extends, as well, to
the injunction's enforcement proceedings. 422 The rationale
issuance out of concern for maintaining the role of juries. See supra note 289
(discussing interim injunctions in England).
419. The proposition traces in England to Clark v. Freeman, (1848) 50 Eng.
Rep. 759, 761 (M.R.), and in America to Flint v. Hutchinson Smoke Burner Co.,
19 S.W. 804, 805 (Mo. 1892). However, the proposition was not acted on in
England until the late 1870s and in America until the mid-twentieth century.
420. See, e.g., Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666, 675-77 (3d. Cir. 1991);
Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 218 S.E.2d 54, 62 (Ga. 1975); Advanced Training
Sys. v. Caswell Equip. Co., 352 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 1984). See also Sedler,
supra note 19, at 154 (noting "[I]f the state constitution ... requirfes] a jury
trial, the court can summon a jury to pass on these questions"). Kramer
describes one of the early cases, O'Brien v. University Community Tenants
Union, 327 N.E.2d 753, 755 (Ohio 1975), predicated on there having been a jury
trial, but this does not appear expressly in the Ohio Supreme or Appellate court
reports. Kramer, 947 F.2d at 677.
421. See, e.g., Balboa Island, 156 P.3d at 344-45 (speaking of a
"determin[ation] at trial"); Cochran v. Tory, No. B159437, 2003 WL 22451378,
at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2003) (speaking of a "full trial"), vacated, 554 U.S.
734 (2005). Balboa Island is particularly ambiguous because it involved a suit
only for an injunction and I have been unable to determine whether California
procedure allowed for a jury trial. Cochran was a suit for damages and an
injunction; the defendant did not ask for a jury trial.
422. Typically, injunctions are enforced without the intervention of a jury if
they are civil, and if criminal, no jury is required if the punishment is less than
six months in jail or a fine of $500 or less. 1 DOBBS, supra note 416, § 2.8(1), at
187, § 2.8(3), at 196-97, § 2.(4), at 204-06; Travis J. Ketterman, The Demands of
a Jury Demand, 51 FED. LAw. 16, (2004) (discussing civil and criminal
contempt); Note, Authority of the Trial Judge, 35 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM.
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for this extension follows from an inherent problem in
drafting injunctions that restrain defamation. 423
Courts and commentators generally agree that if
defamation is to be enjoined, the injunction must be
narrowly tailored to prohibit only the remarks that were
determined to be libelous at trial.424 Enjoining only what
has been found defamatory is problematic for a variety of
interrelated reasons. In most cases a prohibition limited to
exactly what has been found defamatory would be "useless
because a defendant can avoid its restrictions by making
the same point using different words."425 In addition,
whether a remark is defamatory depends on a variety of
contextual factors, including state of mind, which cannot be
adequately delimited in a court order. 426 Finally, facts
change and what was false at one point, or stated with an
actionable state of mind, may no longer be false or stated
with that mens rea. 427
It is true that some cases might involve facts and
contexts that cannot change. The earliest cases departing
from the no-injunction rule involved claims of patent
PROC. 553, 563-71, 575 (2006) (discussing civil and criminal contempt).
423. Indeed, the drafting problem is a significant part of the argument for
the continued propriety of the no-injunction rule. See Balboa Island, 156 P.3d at
356-57 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting); Chemerinsky, supra note 397,
at 171-72.
424. See, e.g., Tory, 534 U.S. at 738; Balboa Island, 156 P.3d at 351-53;
Bertelsman, supra note 19, at 322; Chemerinsky, supra note 397, at 171; Gold,
supra note 19, at 253-54.
425. Chemerinsky, supra note 397, at 171. See also Balboa Island, 156 P.3d
at 356 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting) (discussing how "[slubtle
differences in wording can make it exceptionally difficult to determine whether
a particular utterance falls within an injunction's prohibition"). For example, in
Balboa Island, the trial court's order prohibited the defendant from saying,
inter alia, the "[p]laintiff stays open until 6:00 a.m." and "[p]laintiff encourages
lesbian activities." Id. at 354. Does it violate the injunction if defendant were to
say the plaintiff "doesn't close until 5:45 and promotes homosexual practices"?
426. See, e.g., Balboa Island, 156 P.3d at 356 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting) (giving example of the defendant responding to an inquiry by a
reporter that inquired about what the court had prohibited her to say; and
discussing how shouting fire in a crowded theater may or may not violate legal
constraints); Chemerinsky, supra note 397, at 171-72 (discussing the problem
generally).
427. See Balboa Island, 156 P.3d at 356 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting); Chemerinsky, supra note 397, at 171-72.
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infringement by existing products.428 That those claims
could not possibly change may have encouraged the grant of
an injunction. 429 Still, defamation suits in which the facts or
context cannot change are rare.
Accordingly, to be effective, an injunction restraining
defamation cannot be limited exactly to what has been
found actionable. It must cover a broader range of remarks
and be drafted somewhat abstractly. Inevitably, the
injunction's enforcement will require discretionary
determinations of what the injunction meant and whether
it has been violated. 430 It may be that this problem is
sufficiently severe to counsel retention of the no-injunction
rule;431 or it may be that the harm to the maligned plaintiff
is sufficient to make the inevitable overbreadth
constitutionally permissible. My observation, however, is
that if enjoining defamation is to be permitted, the
discretionary judgments necessarily exercised in enforcing
any effective injunction calls for the double protection that
is provided by the involvement of a jury as well as a judge.
Indeed, the protection of a jury may be even more
appropriate in the enforcement phase, since it is the judge's
428. See, e.g., Emack v. Kane, 34 F. 46 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1888) (discussed supra
text accompanying notes 379-88); Thorley's Cattle Food Co. v. Massam, (1880)
L.R. 14 Ch. D. 763 (Ct. App.) (trade-secret infringement); Clapp, supra note 324,
at 707. Consider also that in England, the courts preferred to enjoin the
continued circulation of documents, rather than oral remarks, that had been
found libelous. See MITCHELL, supra note 267, at 91-92.
429. Consider, on similar grounds, the Supreme Court's willingness to grant
an injunction after a book had been found obscene, Kingsley Books, Inc. v.
Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957), or uphold an administrative order prohibiting
newspapers from labeling help wanted ads as male or female after the practice
had been found to be gender discrimination, Pittsburg Press Co. v. Pittsburg
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973). But see Kingsley Books, 354
U.S. at 446-47 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (observing that what is obscene depends
on context, so there can be no prospective restraint; jury verdicts are always
required); id. at 447 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the absence of a right
to a jury trial was a fatal defect in the statute).
430. In a state like California, which does not apply the collateral bar rule,
Balboa Island, 156 P.3d at 353-54 (Baxter, J., concurring), there is an
additional reason to require participation of a jury in the injunction's
enforcement proceeding. When the collateral bar rule does not apply, the
defamation defendant is allowed to argue the remarks which violate the
injunction are constitutionally protected because they never were, or are not
now, defamatory. Because it is like a trial de novo, the protections of such a
trial should apply.
431. See Balboa Island, 156 P.3d at 356-57 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting); Chemerinsky, supra note 397, at 171-72.
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own order that the defendant has been seeking to
circumvent. 432
There should be, in other words, a First Amendment
right to a jury trial in proceedings seeking to enforce
injunctions that restrain defamatory speech. Without such
a right, an injunction is an impermissible prior restraint.
Modern commentators find the prior restraint / subsequent
punishment distinction overdrawn because both regimes
deter and chill speech. Historically, the evil of prior
restraint was a matter of adjudicative structure as well as
timing.433 The presence or absence of a jury was central to
the considerations that sensibly distinguished the
impermissible regime of prior restraints from the
permissible regime of subsequent punishment.
As a matter of statutory, if not constitutional law, the
generation of English and American reformers of the late-
eighteenth century focused on guaranteeing full jury
participation in criminal and civil proceedings against
defamatory speech. In the Reconstruction and Civil Rights
eras of the 1860s and 1960s, constitutional reformers
focused on expanding judge-centered protections for
defamation defendants. Any retreat from the traditional
rule that equity cannot enjoin defamation is a legal
innovation that calls for application of the First and
Fourteenth Amendment principle that defamation
defendants have a double protection in which the judge
checks the jury and the jury checks the judge.434
432. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 764-66 (1994)
(discussing the reasons for more active appellate review of injunctions
restricting speech); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 202-05 (1968) (holding that a
jury verdict is required in criminal contempt proceeding where there is a
significant penalty in part because defiance of a judge's order "often strikes at
the most vulnerable and human qualities of a judge's temperament").
433. For a discussion tracing prior restraints to a different structural
concern, see Michael I. Meyerson, Rewriting Near v. Minnesota: Creating a
Complete Definition of Prior Restraint, 52 MERCER L. REV. 1087 (2001) (prior
restraints and separation of powers); Meyerson, supra note 11, at 339-42
(same).
434. Retreat from the no-injunction rule, if it occurs, would bring to the bar
of constitutional adjudication other doctrines besides the ones discussed here.
For example, in defamation cases, does the First Amendment constitutionalize
the principle that injunctions may issue only when the remedy at law is
inadequate? This is especially important when the plaintiff asks only for an
injunction and, therefore, the issue of damages is not otherwise brought before
the trier of fact. In Balboa Island, the California court upheld an injunction
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against a defendant who owned a home next to the inn without any showing
that she would not have been deterred from continuing her defamatory speech
by an award of damages. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting). In addition,
there is the principle that no injunction should issue when the defamatory
speech involves a matter of public interest. That principle is of such obvious
constitutional dimension that it was recognized by the Balboa Island court, id.
at 352, and is recommended by all commentators who oppose the no-injunction
rule. See Bertelsman, supra note 19, at 322; Gold, supra note 19, at 257-58, 261;
Sedler, supra note 19, at 159.
